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C R I M E CLOCKS 1971 
S E R I O U S C R I M E S 
11 EACH M I N U T E 
VIOLENT CRIMES 
ONE EVERv 39 SECONDS 
MURDER 
P N E EVERY 3 0 MINUTES 
FORCIBLE RAPE 
ONE EVERY 13 MINUTES 
A G G R A V A T E D A S S A U L T 
ONE E V E R Y 8 6 SECONDS 
R O B B E R Y 
jHE E V E R Y ) 8 2 SECONDS 
BURuLARY 
ONE E V E R Y I 3 SECONDS 
LARCENY 
(150 and o v e r ) 
ONE E V E i i i 17 SECONDS 
AUTO THEFT 
pNE EVERY 33 SECONDS 
Source: Uniform Crime R e p o r t s , 1 9 7 1 , p. 3 0 . 
An economic a n a l y s i s i n the a r e a of crime has been a l o n g time 
i n coming. I t i s g e n e r a l l y accented, t h a t any e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l of 
crime must I n v o l v e the a l l o c a t i o n of a massive p o r t i o n of our 
n a t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s to the s t r u g g l e . ^'ut w h i l e t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n may 
have been slow i n being r e a l i z e d , the upsurge of p u b l i c p r e s s u r e 
a,nd the consequent a p p r o p r i a t i o n s a t the n a t i o n a l , s t a t e , and l o c a l 
l e v e l s a r e evidence t h a t , i n the r a n k i n g of s o c i a l c r i s e s , crime 
p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l a r e now among the high p r i o r i t y c o n c e r n s . U n t i l 
r e c e n t l y , economists were r e l u c t a n t to attempt any s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
economic t e c h n i q u e s I n a t t a i n i n g e f f i c i e n c y i n the a l l o c a t i o n of 
r e s o u r c e s I n the f i g h t a g a i n s t c r i m e , but today t h i s s o c i o l o g i c a l 
c o n c e r n has tak e n on a v e r y economic hue. 
The l i t e r a t u r e of c r i m i n o l o g y and s o c i o l o g y has long a t t r i b u t e d 
major importance to the impact of economic c o n d i t i o n s on the g e n e r a t i o n 
of c r i m e . Grime i s not a problem which i s as e a s i l y s o l v a b l e or 
e x p l a i n a b l e as o t h e r s o c i a l i l l s . I t i s d i f i e r e n t . I n es s e n c e , i t 
i s human b e h a v i o r under economic c o n d i t i o n s . Combined w i t h t h i s a r e 
h e r e d i t y and environment, the i n t e r a c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y , 
and the t o t a l i t y of human n a t u r e and e x p e r i e n c e , o.nd a l l t o g e t h e r 
these make up the e l e m e n t a l o r i g i n s of cr i m e . Each s i n g l e crime i s 
a r e s r o n s e to a s r - e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n bv a person w i t h an i n f i n i t e l y 
c o m p l i c a t e d p s y c h o l o g i c a l and emotional makeup who i s s u b j e c t to a 
s e r i e s of i n f i n i t e l y c o m p J i c a t e d e x t e r n a l p r e s s u r e s . And crime as a 
whole i s m i l l i o n s of such r e s o o n s e s . 
There a r e some c r i m e s so i r r a t i o n a l , u n p r e d i c t a b l e , e x p l o s i v e , 
and r e s i s t a n t to a n a l y s i s t h a t they can no more be pr e v e n t e d or 
guarded a g a i n s t than can a v o l c a n i c e r u p t i o n or t i d a l wave. Then 
a g a i n t h e r e a r e , a t the other extreme, the m e t i c u l o u s l v planned 
c a r e f u l o p e r a t i o n s of the p r o f e s s i o n a l c r i m i n a l . The moves of these 
i n d i v i d u a l s are so e x c e e d i n g l y r a t i o n a l t h a t i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g the 
p a r t i c u l a r m o t i v a t i o n s of the crime we can comprehend p r e v e n t a t i v e 
measures a l s o . But the b a s i c problem s t i l l r emains. P r e d i c t i n g and 
d i s c o u r a g i n g sudden c r i m i n a l o u t b u r s t s i s as d i f f i c u l t and i ' a f f l i n g 
a problem as how to keep competent and i n t e l l i g e n t i n d i v i d u a l s from 
t a k i n g up crime as t h e i r l i f e ' s work. 
What we do know of crime i s t h a t when i t oocurs, t h e r e a r e 
i n d i v i d u a l s who h-ve such d i s r e g a r d f o r the systems and s t a n d a r d s of 
s o c i e t y , who a t t h a t moment have so l i t t l e c o ncern f o r the w e l f a r e 
of o t h e r s , or have so l i t t l e c o n t r o l over themselves t h a t thev are 
w i l l i n g to taice something which i s not t h e i r s or v i o l a t e the law 
i n some o t h e r way, f o r whatever r e a s o n . So long a s t h e r e e x i s t s i n 
s o c i e t y t h i s s o r t of i n d i v i d u a l , crime w i l l o c cur, amd t h e r e i s not 
r e a l l y a n y t h i n g we can do about i t . No matter how e f f e c t i v e the 
government attempts to be i n i t s e f f o r t s to c o n t r o l c r i m e , as long 
as the c i t i z e n s have the w i l l to v i o l a t e the law, the government i s 
waging a b a t t l e i t cannot p o s s i b l y hope to win. 
From the would-be c r i m i n a l ' s p o i n t of view, t h e r e a r e many cr i m e s 
which would never have been committed, no ma t t e r what k i n d of people 
t h e i r p e r p e t r a t o r s were, i f only the v i c t i m had understood the r e a l 
r i s k t hev were r u n n i n g . Often the v i c t i m of an auto t h e f t i s someone 
who had l e f t h i s keys i n the c a r , tne v i c t i m of an a s s a u l t the one 
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who s t a r t e d , the f i g h t , or the v i c t i m of a l o a n shar-k someone who 
l o s t h i s month's r e n t money a t the l o c a l r a c e t r a c k . 
Reluct8.nce, or i n a b i l i t y to t a k e a c t i o n a.gainst crime .may be 
i n c l u d e d as a n o t h e r p o s s i b l e cause of c r i m e . P u b l i c toier.an.ee of 
something as widespread as w h i t e c o l l a r crime i s p r e v a l e n t because 
i n the eyes of many, on the c o r p o r a t e l e v e l , when making money, a n y t h i n g 
goes."^ Employers a r e r e l u c t a n t to s e r i . o u s l y p r osecute employees f o r 
m a t t e r s of i n t e r n a l t h e f t , and. s h o p l i f t e r s more o f t e n than not escape 
w i t h a warning. Too, many slum d w e l l e r s f e e l so t o t a l l y entrapped 
by the atmosphere of f l o u r i s h i n g crime and v i c e xyhich surrounds them, 
t h a t the-' eventuall.y begin to a c c e p t i t , not a s a m a t t e r of n e g l e c t 
or apathy, but writh f r u s t r a t i o n and f u t i l i t . y . 
I n a sense, s o c i a l and economic c o n d i t i o n s may be s a i d to be 
the r e a l causes of c r i m e . Crime f l o u r i s h e s i n the g h e t t o . C i t y 
slums w i t h t h e i r overcrowded l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s , r a c i a l m a l i c e , c l a s s 
h a t r e d , envy, economic d e p r i v a t i o n , and s o c i a l d i s r u p t i o n a r e v i r t u a l 
hotbeds of crime and i t s r e l a t e d a c t i v i t i e s . At the o t h e r end of 
the spectrum, crime f l o u r i s h e s under c o n d i t i o n s of a f f l u e n c e , where 
the d e s i r e f o r m a t e r i a l goods i s matched onl.y by t h e i r i n c r e a s e d 
a v a i l a b i l i t y . Crime f l o u r i s h e s when t h e r e a r e many r e s t l e s s .voung 
people i n a p o p u l a t i o n ; and crime f l o u r i s h e s when s t a n d a r d s of m o r a l i t y 
a r e undergoing change,^ 
F i n a l l y , the v e r y i n s t i t u t i c n s i n our s o c i e t y xwhich a r e meant 
to p r e v e n t crime before i t has a chance to happen are f a i l i n g i n t h e i r 
a p pointed t a s k s . Otherwise p r e v e n t a b l e c r i m e s w i l l occur i f the 
p o l i c e are s t a r v e d f o r manpower or i n e f f i c i e n t . I f they a r e o v e r -
z e a l o u s , people b e t t e r l e f r a lone w i l l be drawfn i n t o c r i m i n a l c a r e e r s . 
I f the c o u r t system f a i l s to c o n v i c t g u i l t y p a r t i e s w i t h r e a s o n a b l e 
c e r t a i n t y and. promptness, i t ' s v a l u e as a d e t e r r a n t may be b l u n t e d , 
i f not e n t i r e l . y e l i m i n a t e d . I f c o r r e c t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s c o n t i n u e 
i n t h e i r f a i l u r e to " c o r r e c t , " a l l t h a t i s produced i s an i n d i v i d u a l 
who i s thoroughl.y c r i m i n a l l y o r i e n t e d . 
S u c c e s s f u l s t r a t e g i e s f o r f i g h t i n g and r e d u c i n g crime i n the 
l o n g r u n depend almost e n t i r e l y on a i \ a s i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the c a u s a l 
f a c t o r s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h e v e r y d i f f e r e n t major c l a s s of c r i m e . 3 The 
p r e s e n t r e p o r t i n g system i s inadequate i n terms of e f f i c i e n c y , a c c u r a c y , 
and n a t i o n a l u n i f o r m i t y . At the p r e s e n t time we have l i t t l e p r e c i s e 
i n f o r m a t i o n , w i t h o u t which we cannot a c c u r a t e l . y a s s e s s s u c c e s s ( o r 
f a i l u r e ) of our p r e s e n t crime p r e v e n t i o n p o l i c i e s . The problem i s 
indeed one of n a t i o n a l concern. S o c i a l rese- r c h i s an. economic 
n e c e s s i t y but w i l l d i r e c t l y depend on an improvement of t e c h n i q u e s 
of crime r e p o r t i n g and a n a l y s i s . The Uniform Crime R e p o r t s published 
a n n u a l l y by the F e d e r a l Bureau of I n v e s t i g a t i o n nre a t t e m p t i n g to 
f i l l the v o i d w i t h only s p o t t y s u c c e s s . The t a s k i s one which w i l l 
be d i f f i c u l t , c o s t l y , and time consuming, but i n f o r m a t i o n must be 
g a t h e r e d from which p o s s i b l e p o l i c y a c t i o n m,ay r a t i o n a l l y be f o r m u l a t e d . 
The causes of crime a r e tr u l . y numerous, m y s t e r i o u s , and i n e x t r i c a b l y 
i n t e r t v j i n e d . Even to begin, to understand them mammouth amounts of 
r e s e f i r c h must be undertaken concernin-' the amounts and t r e n d s of c r i m e , 
e s t i m a t i o n s , where p o s s i b l e , of the c o s t s of cri.me, s t u d i e s of the 
c o n d i t i o n s under which crime t h r i v e s , i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of c r i m i n a l s and 
the v i c t i m s of c r i m e , and s u r v e y s of the p u b l i c ' s a t t i t u d e s and 
r e a c t i o n s to c r i m e ; f o r no one way of v i e w i n g the p r o b l e n c o u l d d e s c r i b e 
i t w e l l enough as a s i t u a t i o n endemic to our very s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e . 
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The whole f i e l d of c r i m i n o l o g y i s a p r o v i n c e of knowledge and 
a c t i o n o n l y r e c e n t l y deveioped a s a s c i e n t i f i c d i s c i p l i n e . The o n l y 
d i f f i c u l t y t h a t a r i s e s i n d e c e l o p i n g new b a s i c r e s e a r c h i n t h i s f i e l d 
i s one which B r i t i s h c r i m i n o l o g i s t C h a r l e s M e r c i e r noted f i f t y y e a r s 
ago. He s a i d , "There i s no s u b j e c t on which so much nonsense has 
been w r i t t e n as crime and the c r i m i n a l , " ' ^ and perhaps he i s r i g h t . 
However t h e r e a r e few d i s c i p l i n e s which have not encountered t h i s s o r t 
of problem i n t h e i r a t tempts to answer tiae vague t y p e s of inans w e r a b l e 
a u e s t i o n s which pervade the e n t i r e f i e l d of cr i m e . The q u e s t i o n s 
which a r i s e a r e as i m p o s s i b l e to answer as they a r e i m p o s s i b l e t o 
i g n o r e . I n the words of Ramsey C l a r k , "Crime i s the u l t i m a t e human 
d e g r a d a t i o n . I t r e f l e c t s the c h a r a c t e r of a people. We have no 
h i g h e r o b l i g a t i o n t h a n to reduce I t s presence to the l o w e s t p o s s i b l e 
l e v e l s . We know how. The q u e s t i o n i s whether we c a r e . " 3 
S o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s have lo n g r e j e c t e d tne i d e a thsit t h e r e can be 
any p o s s i b l e a l l - i n c l u s i v e t h e o r y to e x p l a i n the crime problem. The 
t r e n d s which a r e o b s e r v a b l e i n crime and l a b o r market c o n d i t i o n s may 
suggest t h a t the g a i n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h c r i m e s a r e regarded a s an 
a l t e r n a t i v e to honest p u r s u i t s . The a r e a of a n a l v s i s i n which most 
c r i m e s appear e x p l a i n a b l e i s concerned w i t h crimes a g a i n s t p r o p e r t y , 
f o r such c r i m e s y i e l d a s i t u a t i o n of almost c e r t a i n economic g a i n f o r 
the c r i m i n a l . P r o p e r t y c r i m e s account f o r 86% of the t o t a l crime 
p i c t u r e . ^ One can then see the n e c e s s i t y f o r v i e w i n g the crime problem 
i n terms of economic a n a l y s i s . 
The normal b e h a v i o r of an i n d i v i d u a l i s t o o f f e r h i s l a b o r or 
time i n r e t u r n f o r an economic g a i n . From an economic v i e w p o i n t , i t 
doesn't matter whether the g a i n i s p a i d i n money or goods which a r e 
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c o n v e r t i b l e to money. The law s which are envxcted to p r o h i b i t c e r t a i n 
t y p e s of economic a c t i v i t i e s c r e a t the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n " c r i m e " and 
the p e n a l t i e s imposed*, a r e p o t e n t i a l c o s t s to the i n d i v i d u a l . A 
r a t i o . n a l i n d i v i d u a l then, w i l l c o n s i d e r onl.v those u n l a w f u l a c t i v i t i e s 
on which the p o t e n t i a l g a i n s exceed the net gains from, a l t e r n a t i v e 
l a w f u l a c t i v i t i e s . iriowever, the d i f f i c u l t . y a r i s e s tha.t economic 
a n a l y s i s r e l i e s on the assumption of r a t i o n a l i t y and hence may not 
be c o m p l e t e l y adequate to e x p l a i n c r i m e s of an unpremeditated, or 
i m p u l s i v e n a t u r e as e f f i c i e n t l y a s i t e x p l a i n s c r i m e s a g a i n s t propert.y. 
The purpose of t h i s paper i s to b r i e f l y summarize the crime 
problem, and to o f f e r an economis a l t e r n a t i v e to the e x p l a n a t i o n of 
the phenomenon of i l l e g a l b e h a v i o r . 
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I . AMOUNT OF CHIME AND TRENDS 
'The t y p e s of a c t i o n s which f i t under the g e n e r a l heading " c r i m e " 
ar e numerous indeed. On a f e d e r a l l e v e l t h e r e a r e 2,800 types of 
a c t i o n s which a l l come under t h i s heading, and depending on where 
checks a r e made throughout the U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e r e i s a much g r e a t e r 
number of s t a t e and l o c a l " c r i m e s . " There a r e those which a r e 
p u r p o r t e d l y the dominion of the .'oung, such as v a n d a l i s m , and those 
c o n s i d e r e d i n the a d u l t r e a l m , such as i n t o x i c a t i o n . Some a r e 
spontaneous a c t i o n s w h i l e o t h e r s a r e r u t h l e s s l y and s y s t e m a t i c a l l y 
p e r p e t r a t e d , and t h e i r range of e f f e c t extends from m i ] d l o s s and/or 
b o d i l y harm to r e g u l a t i o n of the econom'/. 
However, the type of crime which conc-rns the average American 
m.ost i s t h a t which a f f e c t s him p e r s o n a l l v , and i t i s of t h i s realm 
which we a r e speaking when d i s c u s s i n g such a b s t r a c t terms as "the 
crime r a t e . " Our source of n a t i o n a l s t a t i s t i c s r e g a r d i n g the numb-er 
of o f f e n s e s known to the p o l i c e a r e c o l l e c t e d from l o c a l p o l i c e 
o f f i c i a l s by the F B I and p u b i i s h e d annu'xlly as a pa.rt of i t s r e p o r t . 
Crime i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s , Uniform Grime R e p o r t s . So f a r i t remains 
the b e s t t o o l we have a v a i l a b l e to a s s e s s the i n c i d e n c e of crime.''' 
As such, i t i s a product of a nationwide s/stem under which some 
8,000 l o c a l p o l i c e a g e n c i e s c o v e r i n g 92% of the t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n 
r e p o r t o f f e n s e s they know of to the F B I . Each y e a r the r e p o r t c o n t a i n s 
a summary geared suppossedly f o r the g e n e r a l r e a d e r i n t e r e s t e d i n the 
g e n e r a l crime p i c t u r e , and u s u a l l y i t i s a p i c t u r e of increB,sing gloom 
and immenent doom. Ac c o r d i n g to Norvel M o r r i s , a u t h o r of The Honest 
F o l i t i c i a n ' s Guide to Grime C o n t r o l , t h i s i s a c t u a l l y f a r from the 
g e n e r a l p i c t u r e , ^ f o r the evidence r e c o r d e d i s e x t r e m e l y s e l e c t i v e 
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and i n v a r i a b l y emphasizes the i n c r e a s e i n s e r i o u s c r i m e . He contends 
t h a t the crime r a t e r i s e of 6 - 1 ? % per y e a r i s monotonous and not seen 
i n i t s proper p e r s p e c t i v e . C i t i n g one example, the UGH of I 9 6 O notes 
a 98% i n c r e a s e i n the amount of crime over 1 9 5 0 , and t h i s i s e x t r e m e l y 
m i s l e a d i n g to the g e n e r a l p u b l i c , f o r over t h i s same time p e r i o d t h e r e 
was a s u b s t a n t i a l p o p u l a t i o n i n c r e a s e . When ad j u s t m e n t s to the d a t a 
had f i n a l l y been made and the new and proper crime r a t e c a l c u l a t e d , 
( i . e . c r i m e s per 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 i n h a b i t a n t s ) the a c t u a l i n c r e a s e over the 
1 0 y e a r time p e r i o d i s noted by M o r r i s a t only 2 2 % . 9 
We must remember too t h a t the s u b s t a n t i a l ciianges and develop-
ments i n the r e p o r t i n g and e s t i m a t i n g procedures which o c c u r r e d between 
1 9 5 0 and i 9 6 0 may have merely brought i n t o l i g h t more of what i s 
r e f e r r e d to as the dark f i g u r e of crime and thus prodj.uced an i n c r e a s e 
t h a t was i n some p a r t s t a t i s t i c a l i n n a t u r e w i t h o u t being of the 
magnitude one might a t f i r s t s u s p e c t . 
The UGH i t s e l f i s the product of a nationwide system of r e p o r t i n g 
t h a t the F B I has p a i n s t a k i n g l y devel-ped over the / e a r s . The 
c o m p i l a t i o n i s , however, no t e t t e r t han t.he u n d e r l y i n g i n f o r m a t i o n 
which the l o c a l a g e n c i e s supply to the F B I . There a r e , i n f a c t , man/ 
c r i m i n a l a c t s committed which a r e not r e p o r t e d to o f f i c i a l s o u r c e s . 
E s t i m a t e s as to the l e v e l s r eached i n unr e p o r t e d crime can be developed 
through c o s t l y v i c t i m i n t e r v i e w s u r v e y s , but t h i s would i n no way 
remedy the r e l u c t a n c e of v i c t i m s to r e p o r t a l l c r i m e s to law e n f o r c e -
ment a g e n c i e s . 
I t i s the UGR's job to e s t i m a t e a s bes t i t can w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e 
doubt a r e l a t i v e count of c r i m e , so i t l o g i c a l l y moves to the only 
r e a s o n a b l e u n i v e r s e i t has a t i t ' s d i s p o s a l , which i s those c r i m e s 
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which come to the a t t e n t i o n of the p o l i c e . The c r i m e s used i n t h e i r 
Crime Index a r e those which a r e r e p o r t e d w i t h the g r e a t e s t c o n s i s t e n c y 
and the c o m p i l a t i o n s of crime t r e n d s are based on these d a t a . Although 
the UCR may tend to o v e r s t a t e the r i s e i n the crime r a t e , i t has the 
tendency to u n d e r s t a t e the t o t a l volume of c r i m e s committed..-^-^ With 
the p r e s e n t l y a v a i l a l . ) l e s t a t i s t i c s , t h e r e i s no way y e t to prove 
c o n c l u s i v e l y t h a t the U.S. i s indeed experiencin.g a mammouth crime 
wave, nor does anyone r e a l l y know how much crime t h e r e i s i n the U.S. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , i n the jiidgement of the P r e s i d e n t ' s Crime Commission, 
"There i s much crime i n America, m.ore than e v e r i s r e p o r t e d , f a r more 
tha n e v e r i s s o l v e d , f a r too much f o r the h e a l t h of a nation."''"-^ 
Perhaps t h i s s uggests t h a t on a f e d e r a l l e v e l , g e n e r a l acceptance has 
been made of the assumption made by the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y B e l g i a n 
p i o n e e r s t a t i s t i c i a n Adolphe Q u e t e l e t , t h a t the amount of ^nown crime 
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bears a c o n s t a n t r e l a t i o n to the amount unknown. 
Prom a study of apparent i n c r e a s e s i n c r i m e s of v i o l e n c e i n 
postwar England, we f i n d demonstrated t h a t the ge.n.era.l i n c r e a s e i n 
r e p o r t e d crime may s e r i o u s l y be due to a v a r i e t y of ot h e r f a c t o r s , 
a p a r t from the g r e a t e r u n i f o r m i t y and. e f f i c i e n c y i n r e c o r d i n g to which 
so many c r i m i n o l o g i s t s a t t r i b u t e the r i s e tod-ay. To mention a few 
of the f a c t o r s i n d i c a t e d by the stu d y , then, as now, we have b e t t e r 
f a c i l i t i e s a b a i l a b l e to the p u b l i c f o r o b t a i n i n g a s s i s t a n c e from the 
p o l i c e . T h i s i s i n l a r g e p a r t due to c o n t i n u a l l y i n c r e a s i n g expen-
d i t u r e s and and e v e r - c h a n g i n g technology. P r e c i n c t s a r e equipped w i t h 
emergency telephone svsteras p l a c e d s t r a t e g i c a l l y i n g i v e n a r e a s , and 
t h e r e a r e an i n c r e a s e d number of r a d i o - e q u i r p e d p o l i c e v e h i c l e s . These 
changes go arm i n arm w i t h an. i n c r e a s e d r e a d i n e s s on the p a r t of the 
p o l i c e to respond to c a l l s and a d e c r e a s e on the p a r t of the p u b l i c 
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to t o l e r a t e c r i m i n a l b e h a v i o r . A l l these f a c t o r s / c o u l d c o n c e i v a b l y 
l e a d to an a r t i f i c i a l i n c r e a s e i n the crime r a t e . There i s a l s o the 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t i n such c i r c u m s t a n c e s the s t a n d a r d s of b e h a v i o r of 
the community may a c t u a l l y have improved r a t h e r t h a n d e c l i n e d , 
but t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y i s s l i m . 
. Along w i t h the r e l u c t a n c e of p u b l i c t o l e r a t i o n of c r i m i n a l 
b e h a v i o r goes an i n c r e a s e d f e a r f o r i n d i v i d u a l s a f e t y , a s u b j e c t which 
we w i l l l o o k a t l a t e r . However, t h i s f e a r , w n i l e c r e n d i n g an u n e a s i n e s s 
i n com-munity l i f e , may have some redeeming s o c i a l v a l u e . A b e t t e r 
c l i m a t e may be generated f o r d e a l i n g w i t h the whole crime rroblem. 
Out of sheer f e a r f o r s u r v i v a l ^ i f n o t h i n g e l s C j w i l l come b e t t e r 
p u b l i c support f o r b e t t e r methods of p r e v e n t i o n and t r e a t m e n t of 
c r i m i n a l b e h a v i o r . U n f o r t u n a t e l y any type of change i n s o c i a l a t t i t u d e 
w i l l t a k e time. 
Today what we a r e f a c e d w i t h i s a v i r t u a l l y w o r t h l e s s d i s s e m i n a t i o n 
of r e s o u r c e s i n t o m e a n i n g l e s s , m i s l e a d i n g inform.ation. The t o t a l crime 
f i g u r e s we have are doing a g r e a t d i s s e r v i c e to the p u b l i c and perhaps 
c r e a t i n g t h e i r own s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecy. What we need i s some 
s o r t of r e l i a b l e view, one which can be t r u s t e d and whose r e l i a b i l i t y 
i s comparable to the p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e s made i n i t s b e h a l f . 
Norvel M o r r i s , f o r one, c a l l s f o r a s e r i e s of s u r v e y s which would 
e s s e n t i a l l y be soundings i n p l a c e and time."^^ These s u r v e y s must 
make use of sample as w e l l as census t e c h n i q u e s i f we t r u l y a r e to 
begin t o measure the changes i n the e x t e n t of crime w i t h any s o r t of 
p r e c i s i o n f o r s o c i a l p l a n n i n g . 
As mentioned e a r H i e r , the c r i m e s w i t h which most Americans a r e 
concerned a r e those which a r e l i k e l y to i n v o l v e them p e r s o n a l l y . The 
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most f r e q u e n t and s e r i o u s of c r i m e s of v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t the person 
as noted by the UCR's a r e f o r c i b l e r a p e , w i l l f u l homicide, a g g r a v a t e d 
a s s a u l t , and robbery. The F B I a l s o c o l l e c t s o f f e n s e s known s t a t i s t i c s 
f o r .tnree p r o p e r t y c r i m e s , b u r g l a r y , l a r c e n y of .150 and over, and 
motor v e h i c l e t h e f t . These seven c r i m e s a r e grouped t o g e t h e r to form 
the b a s i s of the UCR Index of s e r i o u s c r i p i e s upon which so m*any base 
t h e i r r e s e a r c h . F i g u r e 1 shows the t o t a l s of these o f f e n s e s f o r 1971.-^ 
- F i g u r e 1 . - - E s t i m a t e d Number and 
Fercentage of Index O f f e n s e s , 1 9 ? 1 
A«MuH 
lO to to HO SO U> X ) 7o U O ; 
Compiled i n t h i s index a r e the number of i n c i d e n t s r e p o r t e d to 
the p o l i c e , and not the number of c r i m i n a l s who committed them or the 
number of i n j u r i e s they caused. The c l i m a t e of f e a r i n America i s 
f o s t e r e d by the f e a r of harm from a s t r a n g e r . I n the UCR s t a t i s t i c s , 
the l e g i t i m a c y of t h i s f e a r i s perhaps b e s t measured by the frequency 
of r o b b e r i e s , s i n c e , a c c o r d i n g to the UCk and o t h e r s o u r c e s , about 
70% of a l l w i l l f u l k i l l i n g s , n e a r l y t w o - t n i r d s of a l l aggr'iv t e d 
a s s a u l t s , and a h i v h p e r c e n t ge of rapes are committed, by f r i e n d s , 
f a m i l y members, or o t h e r persons who have p r e v i o u s l y known t h e . v i c t i m . 
For UCR c o m p i l a t i o n purposes, rooberv i s the t a k i n g of p r o p e r t y 
from a person by use of t h r e a t or f o r c e w i t h or w i t h o u t a weapon. 
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On a n a t i o n a l s c a l e , o n l y s l i g h t l y more than h a l f the r o b b e r i e s 
r e p o r t e d i n v o l v e weapons, and about o n e - h a l f a r e s t r e e t , p u r s e -
s n a t c h i n g type r o b b e r i e s . Of those r o b b e r i e s r e p o r t e d to UCfi s t a t i s t i c a l 
bureaus, an unknoiAfn percentage i s made up of a.ttempted r o b b e r i e s . 
The term aggrcivated a s s a u l t c o v e r s a l l a s s a u l t s w i t h i.ntent to 
i n f l i c t bodil.y harm, whether or not the use of a dangerous 'weapon 
i s i n v o l v e d . I n c l u d e d a r e a l l ca.ses of attempted horaicede. Cases 
i n which bodil.y injur.y i s a s u b s i d i a r y i n the course of a reipe or 
b u r g l a r y a r e i n c l u d e d i n the count f o r those c r i m e s r a t h e r than w i t h 
the f i g u r e s f o r a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t . While t h e r e a r e no even i m p r e c i s e 
f i g u r e s f o r a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t s which i n v o l v e s e r i o u s i n . i u r y , a I96O 
UCR study showed t h a t j u v e n i l e gangs committed, l e s s 'than %% of a l l 
a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t , a f a c t which i s indeed i n t e r e s t i n g . . 
About o n e - t h i r d of the UCR t o t a l f o r f o r c i b l e rape i s attempted 
r a p e , but a l l those r a p e s counted involved, the use of f o r c e or t h r e a t 
of some k n i d . C r i m i n a l homicides, on the o t h e r hand, most o f t e n 
occur i n the course of a t t e m p t i n g some o t h e r o f f e n s e . However, u n l i k e 
above, these o f f e n s e s occur on the homicide cou"t r a t h e r than i n the 
t o t a l s f o r the o t h er o f f e n s e s . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t onl.y 
1% of a l l f o r c i b l e r a p e s r e p o r t e d e v e r end i n homicide. 
While t h e r e i s not as much p e r s o n a l danger i n v o l v e d i n the p r o p e r t y 
c r i m e s as w i t h o t h e r c r i m e s , the p o s s i b i l i t y must not be e n t i r e l . y 
d i s c o u n t e d . B u r g l a r y , as d e s c r i b e d b/ the UCR, i s the u n l a w f u l 
e n t e r i n g of a b u i l d i n g to commit a f e l o n y or t h e f t whether or not 
f o r c e i s employed. Only about h a l f of a l l b u r g l a r i e s .involve r e s i d e n c e s , 
and about h a l f of a l l r e s i d e n t i a l b u r g l a r i e s a r e committed d u r i n g 
d a y l i g h t h o u r s . A c c o r d i n g t the UCii, 32% of the e n t r i e s i n t o 
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r e s i d e n c e s a r e made through unlocked doors and windows. But ^ t i s 
only when an u n l a w f u l e n t r y r e s u l t s i n a v i o l e n t c o n f r o m t a t i o n w i t h 
the occupant t h a t the i n c i d e n t would be reco r d e d as a robbery r a t h e r 
t h a n a bur :lo,ry. On a n a t i o n a l s c a l e , only about o n e - f o r t i e t h of a l l 
r e s i d e n t i a l b u r g l a r i e s i n v o l v e such c n f r c n t a t i o n s . 
The p o i n t I am t r y i n g to make here i s , t h a t a c c o r d i n g to UGH 
s t a t i s t i c s , a l t h o u g h d r a s t i c i n c r e a s e s i n the crime r a t e a r e r e p e a t e d l y 
noted y e a r a f t e r y e a r , the g r e a t f e a r of harm which the p u b l i c has 
e x p e r i e n c e d i n the l i g h t of these s t a t i s t i c s i s a l i t t l e out of 
p r o p o r t i o n to the a c t u a l l i k e l i h o o d of harm. The chance f o r p e r s o n a l 
a t t a c k on any American i s a g i v e n y e a r i s about 1 i n 5 5 0 . Many 
so u r c e s agree a l s o on the f a c t t h a t the r i s k of such an a t t a c k from 
f r i e n d s or a c q u a i n t a n c e s and spouses and o t h e r f a m i l y members i s 
about t w i c e a s g r e a t a s i t i s from s t r a n g e r s on the s t r e e t . S t u d i e s 
a l s o sugpest t h a t the 'injury i n f l i c t e d by f a m i l y members or a c q u a i n t a n c e s 
i s l i k e l y to be much more sev e r e than t h a t i n f l i c t e d by s t r a n g e r s . 
As shown by Table 1 , the chance of death by w i l l f u l homicide i s 
about I i n 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 1 7 
Table 1.--Deaths From Other Than N a t u r a l Causes 1 % 
i n 1 9 6 5 
( P e r 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 i n h a b i t a n t s ) 
Motor v e h i c l e a c c i d e n t s 25 
Other a c c i d e n t s 12 
S u i c i d e 12 
P a l l s 1 0 
W i l l f u l homicide . . . . 5 
Drowninv F 
F i r e s 4 
( S o u r c e : N a t i o n a l S a f e t y C o u n c i l , " A c c i d e n t F a c t s , " 
1 9 6 5 ; P o p u l a t i o n R e f e r e n c e Bureau.) 
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The p r o p e r t y c r i m e s make up a p p r o x i m a t e l y 8 7 > of a l l the Index 
c r i m e s and i n c l u d e automobile t h e f t , l a r c e n v , and b u r g l a r y . The 
f i g u r e s r e p o r t e d by the UCR c o n s t i t u t e a r e a s o n a b l e r e l i a b l e i n d i c a t o r 
of the t o t a l volumie of such c r i m e s r e p o r t e d to the p o l i c e but they 
can i n no way a s s e s s the s e r i o u s n e s s of the monetary l o s s e s i n v o l v e d . 
Law L n f o r c e r i e r i t a s s i s t a n c e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n stud_ies seem to i n d i c a t e 
t h a t the non-Index c r i m e s such as f r a u d and embezoleraent a r e much 
more s i g n i f i c a n t i n d o l l a r v a l u r , however, t h e r e a r e no s t a t i s t i c s 
r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e to s u b s t a n t i a t e t n i s argument. 
The UCR i s inte n d e d merely as a t o o l and not as an a b s o l u t e 
crime i :'-'d i c a t o r . I t i s not intended, to a s s i s t i n a s s e s s i n g a l l 
s e r i o u s n a t i o n a l crime prob,lems. F o r example, the o f f e n s e s t a t i s t i c s 
a r e not s u f f i c i e n t t o a s s e s the i n c i d e n c e of crime connected w i t h 
c o r p o r a t e a c t i v i t y . L i k e w i s e such F e d e r a l c r i m e s as a n t i t r u s t 
v i o l a t i o n s , food and drug v i o l a t i o n s , and t a x e v a s i o n a r e not i n c l u d e d . 
Although such c r i m e s c o n s t i t u t e o n l y a s m a l l percentage of a l l o f f e n s e s , 
c r i m e s such as those shown i n Ta b l e 2 a r e a l s o important i n c o n s i d e r i n g 
the n a t i o n a l crime p i c t u r e , - ^ 8 
Table 2 . - - d e l e c t e d l e d e r a l Crime 
(Cases f i l e d i n c o u r t - - 1 9 6 d ) 
s i 8 
V 
350 
8 6 3 
L i q u o r revenue v i o l a t i o n s . . . . . . 2 , 7 2 9 
2 2 9 3 
3,18P-
( S o u r c e : Department of J u s t i c e ) 
P o l i c e s t a t i s t i c s do i n d i c a t e mucn crim.e tuday, nowever, they 
do not even begin to i n d i c a t e the f u l l amount. Those c r i m e s which 
a r e d i r e c t l y r e p o r t e d to p r o s e c u t o r s do not u s u a l l y show up i n p o l i c e 
s t a t i s t i c s anywhere. Often c i t i z e n s do not r e p o r t a crime which 
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which has been commirted, e i t h e r Because the.y f e e l i t won't do any-
good or because p o l i c e w i l l a r r i v e too l a t e and t n e r e appears to be 
no chance of apprehending the c r i m i n a l . Other c r i m e s may be r e p o r t e d 
to the p o l i c e but never get i n t o the s t a t i s t i c a l system. I n an 
attempt to probe t h i s problem more f u l l y , the P r e s i d e n t ' s Commission 
on Law Enforcement and A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of J u s t i c e i n i t i a t e d a c o s t l y 
n a t i o n a l s u r v e y of crime v i c t i m i z a t i o n , f o r i t i s only through t h i s 
s o r t of f u l l and a c c u r a t e knowledge about the amo-unt and k i n d s of 
crime t h a t b e t t e r crime p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l pirograms ma- be 
i n i t i a t e d . A s u r v e y of 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 households was conducted by the 
N a t i o n a l Opinion R e s e a r c h Center of the U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago. 
P a r t i c i p a n t s were asked whether the person ouestioned or anv member 
of t h e i r household had been a v i c t i m of a crime d u r i n g the p a s t y e a r , 
i f the crime had been r e p o r t e d , and i f not, why. 
Other s u r v e y s were conducted i n c i t i e s i n a number of high and 
medium crime r a t e a r e a s of Chicago, Boston, and Washington, D.C. by 
the Bureau of S c i a l S c i e n c e R e s e a r c h of Washington, D.C, and the 
Survey R e s e a r c h Center of the U n i v e r s i t y of Michigan. F o r purposes 
of a n a l y s i s , a l l the s u r v e y s d e l t w i t h households. The f i n d i n g s 
i n d i c a t e d t h a t the a c t u a l amount of crime i n tne United S t a t e s i s 
a c t u a l l y s e v e r a l times t h a t which i s r e p o r t e d i n the UCR,(see Table 3 
on the f o l l o w i n g page).''"^ 
When i n d i v i d u a l s were q u e s t i o n e d as to why, i n c e r t a i n i s t a n c e s 
they had not r e p o r t e d t h e i r v i c t i m i z a t i o n to the p o l i c e , the answers 
vrere varied,. The most f r e q u e n t l y g i v e n response i n the ,aational 
s u r v e y was t h a t the p o l i c e c / u l d not do anythin,g to h e l p . As shown 
i n T able 3 , 68% of those i n d i v i d u a l s r e p o r t i n g m a l i c i o u s m i s c h i e f 
16 
l a b l e J.--Comparison of Survey and UCH R a t e s 
( P e r 100,000 p o p u l a t i o n ) 
UCR r a t e for UCR r a t e f o r 
I n d e x Crimes NOHC s u r v e y i n d i v i. d u a l s i n d i v i d u a l s 
1965-66 1965 and o r g a n i z a -
t i o n s 1965 
W i l l f u l homicide 3.0 5.1 5.1 
F o r c i b l e rape 42.5 11.6 11.6 
nobbery 94.0 61.4 61.4 
A g g ravated a s s a u l t 218. 3 106.6 106.6 
B u r g l a r y 949.1 299.6 005.3 
L a r c e n y (B50 and o v e r ) 606.5 267.4 393.3 
Motor v e h i c l e t h e f t 206.2 226.0 251.0 
T o t a l v i o l e n c e 357.8 184.7 184.7 
T o t a l p r o p e r t y l , ? 6 l . 8 793.0 1,219.6 
( S o u r c e : "Uniform Crime R e p o r t s , " I 9 6 5 . p. 5 1 . The UCR n a t i o n a l 
t o t a l s do not d i s t i n g u i s h c r i m e s committed a g a i n s t i n d i v i d u a l s or 
households from those committed a g a i n s t b u s i n e s s e s of o t h e r o r g a n i z a -
t i o n s . The UCH r a t e f o r i n d i v i d u a l s I s t'18 p u b l i s h e d n a t i o n a l r a t e 
a d j u s t e d to e l i m i n a t e b u r g l a r i e s , l a r c e n i e s , a-.d v e h i c l e t h e f t s not 
committed a g a i n s t i n d i v i d u a l s or households. No adjustment was made 
f o r r o b b e r y . ) 
responded i n t h i s manner, and 60% of those not r e r o r t i n g b u r g l a r i e s 
and l a r c e n i e s of ,'550 and over b e l i e v e d t i l s to be t r u e . However, 
a c c o r d i n g to the commission r e p o r t , the r e s u l t s may not demonstrate 
the i n a b i l i t y of tne p o l i c e to h e l p , but merely the v i c t i m ' s 
r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of h i s f a i l u r e to r e p o r t . I n c a s e s of a s s a u l t and 
f a m i l y c r i m e , f e a r of r e p r i s a l was noted w i t h f r e q u e n c y . The c a t e g o r y 
i n which e x t e n t of f a i l u r e to r e p o r t was n i g n e s t was i n consumer 
f r a u d ( 9 0 % ) and l o w e s t f o r auto t h e f t . 2 0 
Although t h e r e a r e s t i l l a number of m e thodological problems 
i n h e r e n t i n the s u r v e y technique of crime assessment, the i n f o r m a t i o n 
d i s c o v e r e d i n t h i s manner has proven i t s e l f of considera'-le v a l u e . 
The P r e s i d e n t ' s Conmission on Law Enforcement and A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of 
J u s t i c e b e l i e v e s t h i s t echnique to hove a. g r e a t untapped p o t e n t i a l 
i n p r o v i d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the r e l s - t i v e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of 
Table M.---Vi c t i m s 
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• Most Im p o r t a n t Reason f o r Not 
N o t i f y i n g P o l i c e ( I n p e r c e n t a g e s ) 
neasons f o r -rrt n o t i f y i n g p o l i c e 
P e r c e n t 
of c a s e s F e l t i t P o l i c e 
i n which was p r i - c o u l d not Too con-
Crimes p o l i c e v a t e be e f f e c - D i d not f u s e d or 
not m a t t e r or t i v e or want to d i d not F e a r of 
n o t i f i e d d i d not would t a k e know r e p r i s a l 
want to not want time how to 
harm to Be r e p o r t 
of f e n d e r bothered 
nobbery 35 2? -bb 9 u 
Aggravated a s s a u l t 35 50 25 4 8 13 
Simple a s s a u l t 54 50 35 4 ' 4 7 
i B u r g l a r y 42 30 63 4 2 2 
L a r c e n y ($50 and o v e r ) 40 23 62 7 • - 7 0 
! L a r c e n y (under $50) 63 31 58 7 3 
iiuto t h e f t 11 ^^ 20 ^^ -60 ^^ 0 *0 '^^ 20 
M a l i c i o u s m i s c h i e f 62 23 68 5 2 2 
Consumer f r a u d 90 50 40 0 10 0 
o t h e r f r a u d (bad c h e c k s , 
s w i n d l i n g , e t c . ) 74 4 1 35 16 8 0 
Sex o f f e n s e s ( o t h e r t h a n 
f o r c i b l e r a p e ) 49 40 50 0 5 5 
F a m i l y c r i m e s ( d e s e r t i o n 
n o n - s u p r o r t , e t c . ) 50 65 17 10 0 7 
Source: NOHC Survey. 
•"'^ '^Less t h a n 0.5%. 
*There were o / l y 5 i n s t a n c e s i n which auto t h e f t was 
not r e p o r t e d . 
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F i g u r e 2 
21 
I N D E X C R I M E T R E N D S , 1933-1965 
Reported c r i m e s a g a i n s t the person 
1 9 4 0 
Note 
Source 
S c a l e f o r w i l l f u l 
homicide and f o r c i b l e 
rape e n l a r g e d , to show 
t r e n d . 
F B I , Uniform Crime 
R e p o r t s S e c t i o n . 
1933 1 9+ 0 
fi|nrl inYfr i 
1 9 5 0 i 9 6 0 1 9 6 5 
Note: The s c a l e f o r t h i s 
f i g u r e i s not cbmparable 
w i t h t h a t used i n 
F'igure 2. 
Source: F B I , Uniform Crirae 
R e p o r t s S e c t i o n . 
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d i f f e r e n t crime c o n t r o l programs. 2,3 
Of a l l the p o s s i b l e c o n d i t i o n s which may be cited_ f o r the 
a p p a r e n t l y s p i r a l i n g i n c r e a s e i n the crime p i c t u r e , the f i r s t i s indeed 
obvious. I f we assume merely t h a t the p r o p o r t i o n of c r i m e s to p o p u l a t i o n 
were to remain s t a b l e and n e i t h e r increa,se or d e c r e a s e , the t o t a l 
volume or a b s o l u t e amount of crime would show a marked, i n c r e a s e e v e r y 
y e a r , merely as a r e s u l t of the r o p u l a t i o n increa.se. F o r example, i f , 
i n a g i v e n y e a r the p o p u l a t i o n was noted a I50 m i l l i o n or so, and i n 
t e n y e a r s i t nad i n c r e a s e d to 200 m i l l i o n , t hen c e t e r u s p a r i b u s , a 
25% i n c r e a s e i n the crim.e r a t e would a u t o m a t i c a l l y be noted. I t can 
be assumed t h a t w i t h g r e a t e r p o p u l a t i o n d e n s i t i e s h i g h e r crime r a t e s 
w i l l be noted, however t h i s does not change the f a c t t h a t the amount 
of crime h i s i n c r e a s e d a t a much f a s t e r r a t e t h a n has the p o p u l a t i o n . 
F i g u r e 4 
C R I M E AND I C P U L A T I C N 
1 9 6 6 - 1 9 7 1 
P e r c e n t change over I 9 6 6 
Crirae 
up 8 3% 
Cx'ime iiat e 
up 74% 
P e r u ] a t i o n 
up 5% 
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and t h e r e f o r e h i g h crime r a t e s . But t h e r e a r e too raanv u n e x p l a i n e d 
v a r i a b l e s f o r t h i s to be a t o t a l e x p l a n a t i o n . The r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between crime r a t e s and u r b a n i z a t i o n i s not simple and p r e c i s e 
c a u s a l f a c t o r s a r e probably i n d e t e r m i n a t e . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t no 
s i n g l e socioeconomic v a r i a b l e i s s t r o n g l y c o r r e l a t e d to the l e v e l of 
c r i m e , but the complex c o n f i g u r a t i o n of many of these v a r i a b l e s i s 
l i k e l y to produce an environment which encourages c r i m e . 
A f f l u e n c e i t s e l f i s c o n s i d e r e d to be one of the major ca u s e s 
of c r i m e . B e s i d e s the f a c t t h a t w e a l t h i s unevenly d i s t r i b u t e d 
throughout our s o c i e t y , t h e r e a r e an i n c r e a s e d number of c r i m i n a l 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s which p r e s e n t t n e r a s e l v e s . T h i s combined w i t h i n c r e a s e d 
mass media p o r t r a y a l of w e a l t h c r e a t e s a c l i m a t e of i n c r e a s i n g 
m a t e r i a l a s p i r a t i o n s , and t h i s i s r e f l e c t e d i n i n c r e a s e d o f f e n s e s 
a g a i n s t p r o p e r t y which c o n s t i t u t e about 86% of a l l index c r i m e s i n 
the U.S. T h i s i n c r e a s e d a f f l u e n c e may a l s o have l e d i n d i r e c t l y to 
a c e r t a i n amount of breakdown i n p a r e n t a l c o n t r o l , thus c r e a t i n g 
g r e a t e r j u v e n i l e independence and increased, e x p e c t a t i o n s of p o l i c e 
p r o t e c t i o n and t h e r e f o r e i n c r e a s e s i n the crime which i s r e p o r t e d . 
The i d e a s mentioned as to the e x i s t i n g crime p i c t u r e l e n d support 
to the concept t h a t t h e r e has not o n l v been an i n c r e a s e i n the volume 
and. r a t e of c r i m e , but a l s o t h a t u n l e s s some s o r t of d r a s t i c and 
immediate v i g o r o u s a c t i o n i s t a k e n t h i s t r e n d w i l l c o n t i n u e . The 
c l i m a t e i n America i s one of i n c r e a s i n g f e a r which s e r v e s to d i m i n i s h 
the amenity of l i f e j u s t as much i f not more so tnan r e a l crime and 
reduces c o n f i d e n c e and freedom i n s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n . I t i s t u r n i n g 
the American Dream i n t o the American nigh!mare. 
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Perhaps more imp o r t a n t than an a b s o l u t e p o p u l a t i o n i n c r e a s e 
i s the changing age s t r u c t u r e of t h a t p o p u l a t i o n . Youths under 18 
account f o r over 5%% of t o t a l l a r c e n y a r r e s t s f o r each r a c e . For the 
age groups between 14 and 2 4 , a r r e s t r a t e s f o r youths i n the economic 
f e l o n i e s ( r o b b e r y , b u r g l a r y , l a r c e n y , and auto t h e f t ) a r e one or two 
o r d e r s of magnitude h i g h e r than f o r youths a g e n e r a t i o n o l d e r . The 
marked i n c r e a s e of t h i s segment of the p o p u l a t i o n may have o r i g i n a l l y 
been due to the post-war baby boom so tha.t the s i z e of t h i s group 
would grow d i s p r o p o r t i o n a l l y to the r e s t of the p o p u l a t i o n . The 
median age i n the United S t a t e s has been shown to have d e c l i n e d from 
3 0 . 3 y e a r s i n 1 9 5 2 to 2 7 . 7 i n 1 9 6 7 » and i n the words of C a r o l S. Vance 
a D.A. i n Houston, T e x a s , "Too many p a r e n t s and a d u l t s have l e t t h i s 
become a k i d ' s w o r l d w i t h o u t e x e r c i s i n g the concern and d i s c i p l i n e 
needed toda y . " ^ 3 
A l s o s i g n i f i c a n t i s the o v e r a l l p o p u l a t i o n d i s t r i b u t i o n i n r u r a l , 
suburban, urban, and i n n e r c i t y a r e a s . With i n c r e a s i r i g l y l a r g e c i t i e s 
i n c r e a s i n g l y l a r g e r crime r a t e s have been r e p o r t e d . Averaae r a t e s • 
of o f f e n s e s a r e a t l e a s t twotimes as g r e a t in. c i t i e s of more than 
0"e m i l l i o n , t h a n i n suburbs or r u r a l a r e a s . J u s t w i t h i n the l a s t 30 
y e a r s , the g r e a t e s t perce"^tage crime i n c r e a s e has been i n c i t i e s w i t h 
p o p u l a t i o n s of more th a n o n e - h a l f m i l l i o n , which, w i t h l e s s than 18% 
of the t o t a l p o r u l a t i o n , account f o r over h a l f the renorted. index 
c r i m e s a g a i n s t the person and almost a t h i r d of the r e p o r t e d index 
propert.y c r i m e s . 
The problem stems not only from the f a c t t h a t c i t i e s have l a r g e 
p o p u l a t i o n s , hut these urban i n d i v i d u a l s o f t e n f i n d themselves h e a v i l y 
c o n c e n t r a t e d i n poor a r e a s which a l r e a d y have h i g h d e l i n q u e n c y r a t e s 
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And I f the f i r s t r e a c t i o n to a l l of t h i s i s t h a t i n increased, 
p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e f o r p u b l i c w e l f a r e programs l i e s the r o o t of a l l 
d e s i r a b l e change, I have nut to c i t e an a r t i c l e which appeared i n 
the U.N. Monthly C h r o n i c l e . I n d i s c u s s i n g comparative cri.me r a t e s , 
i t noted, from s u r v e y work which had. been completed, t h a t i t was 
s i g n i f i c a n t to note t h a t c o u n t r i e s h a v i n g the h i g h e s t l e v e l s of h e a l t h , 
e d u c a t i o n , and n a t i o n a l incone g e n e r a l l y a r e the ones most plagued 
by c r i m e . ~ ' Then, too, one cannot say t h a t t h e i r d o l l a r s were 
not w e l l spent. T r u e , g r e a t sums were expended on improving housing, 
h e a l t h , w o rking c o n d i t i o n s , x v e l f a r e , and s o c i a l s e c u r i t . y , but 
seemingly i n a way which was not s u f f i c i e n t l y aimed a t p r e v e n t i o n 
of c r i m e . T h i s c o u l d be p a r t of the problem i n America. 
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I I . THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CRIME 
" I t I s worth n o t i n g t h a t r e s e a r c h commands only a s m a l l 
f r a c t i o n of 1% of the t o t a l e x p e n d i t u r e f o r crime c o n t r o l . 
There i s probably no s u b j e c t of comparable concern to which 
the n a t i o n i s d e v o t i n g so many r e s o u r c e s and sgr7much e f f o r t 
w i t h so l i t t l e knowledge of what i t i s doinsr." 
P r e s e n t i n c r e a s e d budget a p p r o p r i a t i o n s to f i g h t the war on 
crime does indeed r ^ i s e some i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n s about the most 
advantageous s t r a t e g y to f o l l o w . Although the d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h i s 
budget among the v a r i o u s crime r r e v e n t i o n p o s s i b i l i t i e s i s p a r t i a l l y 
a p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n , i t should be accompanied by some s o r t of 
economic r a t i o n a l , or the intended crime p r e v e n t i o n s e r v i c e s mivht 
never be r e a l i z e d and r e s o u r c e s wasted. 
Simon Ro t t e n b e r g p o i n t s out i n h i s a r t i c l e i n Crime I n Urban 
S o c i e t y t h a t from s o c i e t y ' s p o i n t of view, the e r a d i c a t i o n of a l l 
crime can be a much too e x p e n s i v e p r o j e c t to attempt to undertake. 
I f we f o l l o w a method of a n a l y s i s s i m i l a r to n o i t e n b e r g ' s , we f i n d 
t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e to form a f e a s i b l e s t r a t e g y f o r d e t e r m i n i n g the 
op t i m a l mix of crime p r e v e n t i o n s e r v i c e s which s o c i e t y should supply. 
For each c l a s s of c r i m e , the r a c e a t which crime p r e v e n t i o n 
c o s t s f o r t h a t crime w i l l v a r y w i t h the crime r a t e f o r t h a t o f f e n s e . 
For example. F i g u r e 5 shows two c r i m e s , A and B. I f we assume the 
p r e s e n t crime r a t e to be a maximum of 1 0 0 % , the e x p e n d i t u r e of funds 
i n the p r e v e n t i o n program of e i t h e r crime w i l l r e s u l t i n a lower 
r a t e f o r each c r i m e . At some g i v e n l e v e l of the new reduced crime 
r a t e , the c o s t of f u r t h e r r e d u c t i o n w i l l i n c r e a s e v e r y r a p i d l y and, 
as R o t t e n b e r g s u g g e s t s , become p r o h i b i t i v e . However, as suggested i n 
the f i g u r e , some crimes can be reduced s u b s t a n t i a l l y ( c r i m e A) before 
2 4 
F i g u r e 5 . - - H y p o t h e t i c a l Crime P r e v e n t i o n C o s t s ^ ? 
Crime A Crime B 
I 
R e l a t i v e 
Cost \ \ 
\ 
\ N 
s "-.^  
0 2 5 
(Crime r a t e , 
50 75 1 0 0 
1 0 0%=present r a t e ) 
c o s t s w i l l r i s e r a p i d l y . P'or some o t h e r c r i m e s ( l i k e crime B) r i s i n g 
c o s t s a r e e x p e r i e n c e d v e r y e a r l y i n the war on c r i m e . Something such 
as the i l l e g a l use of m a r i j u a n a might f a l l i n t o the H c a t e g o r y . 3 ^ 
deployment of crime p r e v e n t i o n r e s o u r c e s a t p o i n t s of e n t r y i n t o the 
c o u n t r y can probably reduce the supply of m a r i j u a n a and p o s s i b l e 
r a i s e i t s r e s a l e p r i c e i n a l l the n a t i o n ' s c i t i e s . The quantit," of 
"pot" which would then be demanded would t h e r e f o r e be reduced. However, 
s i n c e the i l l e g a l a c t of consumption i s u s u a l l y committed, i n p r i v a t e 
w i t h l i t t l e daraage to t h i r d p a r t i e s , i t i s e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t to 
d e t e c t . To reduce t h i s crime r a t e f u r t h e r i t would be necesfvary to 
a s s i g n s u b s t a n t i a l l y more n a r c o t i c s p e r s o n n e l , but the l i k e ] i h o o d 
of r e s u l t s i s s l i m w i t h t h i s course of a c t i o n . The a p p r o p r i a t e 
s t r a t e g y i s t h e r e f o r e l i k e l y to i n v o l v e something l i k e the c e s s a t i o n 
of e x p e n d i t u r e of r e s o u r c e s on crome B long before they a r e stopped 
on crime A.-^ "^  
But to p r o v i d e a complete economic r a t i o u a l e f o r crime p r e v e n t i o n 
s t r a t e g i e s i t i s not enough to .merely have a knowledge of the r e l a t i v e 
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c o s t l e v e l s i n the crime r e l a t i o n s h i p . As R o t t e n b e r g has p o i n t e d 
out, an e s t i m a t e f o r the b e n e f i t s of crime p r e v e n t i o n programs f o r 
each type of crime i s a l s o i m p o rtant. 3 2 Such b e n e f i t s can o n l y 
r e a l l y be obtained through e x t e n s i v e s u r v e y and i n f o r m a t i o n c o m c i l -
a t i o n t e c h n i a u e s which i n c l u d e the avoidance of c o s t s caused by 
c r i m i n a l a c t s , the c o s t of p r o p e r t y d e s t r o v e d by c r i m i n a l s or i n t h e i r 
c a p t u r e , the c o s t s of o p e r a t i n g the c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system, and the 
l o s s of v i c t i m ' s e a r n i n g s . 3 3 
I n such a c o s t - b e n e f i t r a t i o , the economic r a t i o n a l e can be 
expressed, by recommending t h a t r e s o u r c e s be a l l o c a t e d to crime 
p r e v e n t i o n programs as long as the b e n e f i t s which r e s u l t exceed 
c o s t s and up to the p o i n t where e x t r a ( m a r g i n a l ) b e n e f i t s e c u a l e x t r a 
( m a r g i n a l ) c o s t s . F i g u r e 6 i l l u s t r a t e s t n i s o p t i m i z i n g s t r a t e g y . 
F i g u r e 6 . - - H y p o t h e t i c a l Cost-.Benefit R e l a t i o n s h i p 
f o r S e v e r a l Crimes 
m a r g i n a l 
be ne f i t 
add 
m a r g i n a l 
c o s t 









Here we assume we a r e d e a l i n g w i t h a u n i v e r s e of t h r e e c r i m e s . For 
trie sake of s i m p l i c i t y , we s h a l l assume marginal c o s t to be c o n s t a n t . 
F o r the f i r s t c r i m e , the m a r g i n a l b e n e f i t s d e c l i n e q u i c k l y and f a l l 
below th'-r m a r g i n a l c o s t of x. The optimum d o l l a r c o s t which has 
been a l l o c a t e d to t h i s crime i s r e p r e s e n t e d by OA. S i r a i l a r l . v , 0.B and 
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OC r e p r e s e n t the crime p r e v e n t i o n funds which shvjuld be a l l o c a t e d 
to tne o t h e r two c r i m e s , and MB^. 
3 3 
There i s , however, a d i f f i c u l t y which a r i s e s i n t h i s approach.-^-^ 
I n d e t e r m i n i n g the o r t i m a l mix combination i t assumes a crime preven-
t i o n budget which i s t o t a l l y f l e x i b l e a l l the way up to the e a u i l i b r i u r a 
p o s i t i o n of m a r g i n a l c o s t - m a r g i n a l b e n e f i t e q u a l i t y . But p r a c t i c a l l y 
s p e a k i n g , the a c t u a l budget s i z e i s the r e s u l t of p o l i t i c a l manoeuvres 
and the budget which e v e n t u a l l y emerges may not a l l o w the e q u i l i b r i u m 
p o s i t i o n f o r each c l a s s of crime to be a c h i e v e d . (The s i z e of the 
crime p r e v e n t i o n budget depends on i t s r e l a t i v e c o s t - b e n e f i t r a t i o 
w i t h o t h e r p u b l i c s e r v i c e programs. I f t h e r e were to be more funds 
a l l o c a t e d to crime p r e v e n t i o n programs i t c o u l d mean t h a t t h e r e would 
be l e s s f o r h e a l t h and e d u c a t i o n programs. Then, indeed, t h i s may 
s e r v e to show t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s a p a i n f u l l y econoTnic e x p l a n a t i o n f o r 
the p r e s e n t crime p r e v e n t i o n budget being i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r o p t i m i z a t i o n 
of e x p e n d i t u r e s on each c l a s s of c r i m e . ) The d i f f i c u l t i e s then become 
more complex i n t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n , f o r i t 'ecomes n e c e s s a r y to 
e s t i m a t e the c o s t s of b e n e f i t s of v a r i o u s l e v e l s of p r e v e n t i o n e f f o r t , 
thus attoT^pting to s t i m u l a t e the b e n e f i t s a t d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s . Then, 
g i v e n the l i m i t e d t o t a l budget which i s a v a i l a b l e , we might hope 
to o p t i m i z e the mix of crime p r e c e n t i o n s e r v i c e s . Economiic f a c t o r s 
a r e e x t r e m e l y important i n the f o r m a t i o n of p o l i c i e s and a t t i t u d e s . 
The whole community s u f f e r s to some degree from c r i m e ' s ' • l 
heavy economic "burden. n e l a t i v e r i s k s cannot be a s c e r t a i n e d u n t i l 
the f u l l e x t e n t of economic l o s s i s known. As inentioned e a r l i e r , 
p o l i c i e s cannot be f o r m u l a t e d u n t i l i t i s g e n e r a l l y known which 
c r i m e s cause the g r e a t e s t economic l o s s and which the l e a s t . The 
27 
c o s t s of p r e v e n t i n g the crime or p r o t e c t i n g a g a i n s t i t must be a s s e s s e d 
as w e l l as whetoer or not a p a r t i c u l a r g e n e r a l crime s i u a t i o n w a r r a n t s 
f u r t h e r e x p e n d i t u r e s f o r c o n t r o l or p r e v e n t i o n , and i f so, which type 
of e x p e n d i t u r e I s l i k e l y to nave the g r e a t e s t imp'-ict. 
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The amount of I n s u r a n c e a p l a n t or b u s i n e s s c a r r i e s and the 
s i z e of i t s i n t e r n a , l s e c u r i t v f o r c e and even the nunTer of polTce'/en 
employed i n a g i v e n g e o g r a p h i c a l ar'^a a r e c o n t r o l l e d 11) some degree 
by economics - i n a simple balance arrangement, weighing t h a t which 
i s t o be gained a g a i n s t a d d i t i o n a l e x p e n d i t u r e s . I f p r o p e r t y 
p r o t e c t i o n i s i n v o l v e d , the economic l o s s from tne crime must be 
d i r e c t l y weighed a g a i n s t the c o s t s of b e t t e r p r e v e n t a t i v e measures 
or c o n t r o l . The i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e aoout the economic c o s t of 
crime i s most u s e f u l l y presented as a s e r i e s of p u b l i c and p r i v a t e 
c o s t s as w e l l as s p e c i f i c p r o p e r t y l o s s e s i n the t o t a l , o v e r a l l 
p i c t u r e . The same c o n d i t i o n s apply to any c o s t d i s c u s s i o n as those 
which app] led to the i n c i d e n c e d i s c u s s i o n . E s t i m a t e s re iched by 
adding t o g e t h e r a l l s o r t s of c o s t s r e l a t e d to crime i n an e f f o r t to 
p r e s e n t some t o t a l f i g u r e as to the end c o s t of crime to tne community 
i s an eoonomlc a b s u r d i t y . The lumping t o g e t h e r of such v a r i e d items 
as the f e e s p a i d f o r the one-time i l l e g a l a b o r t i o n s , the p o t e n t i a l 
e a r n i n g s of p r i s o n e r s , the a c r u a l e a r n i n g s of policemen, the e a r n i n g s 
of a p r o s t i t u t e , and. the o v e r a l l c o s t s of o p e r a t i n g our l e g a l system 
to a s s e s s the c o s t of crime by many s o - c a l l e d a u t h o r o t a t i v e s o u r c e s 
i s indeed f o o l i s h . The u l t i m a t e d-ollars and. c e n t s v a l u e could onl.y 
r e a l i s t i c a l l y be determined i f we could, a s s e s s the g l o b a l t o t a l of 
n a t i o n a l income as i t would be i f t h e r e were no crime a,nd ever.yone's 
morals were i d e a l , and tnen s u b t r a c t from t n t tne n a t i o n a l Income 
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as i t e x i s t s w i t h c o n d i t i o n s of v i c e and o r g a n i z e d c r i m e . 3 5 However, 
even t h i s would i n v o l v e so many cosmic assumptions t h a t r e a l i s t i c 
economic a n a l y s i s x-jould be i m p o s s i b l e . i t i s t h e r e f o r e f a r w i s e r t o 
attempt to seek answers to q u e s t i o n s more l i m i t e d i n scope.3 8 
F i g u r e 7 r e p r e s e n t s s i x d i f f e r e n t c a t e g o r i e s of r e l a t i v e economic 
impacts of cr i m e , b o t h ' p u b l i c and p r i v a t e (see f o l l o w i n g page). 
Numerous c r i m e s were omitted due t o l a c k of f i g u r e s and as such, those 
i n c l u d e d a r e merely e s t i m a t e s from recorded, d a t a and a r e t h e r e f o r e 
not of a b s o l u t e r e l i a b i l i t y . 
C oncerning the economic impact of i n d i v i d u a l c r i m e s , the P r e s i d e n t ' s 
Commission on Law Enforcement and. the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of J u s t i c e has 
the f o l l o w i n g to r e p o r t : 
The p i c t u r e of crime as seen through c o s t i n f o r m a t i o n 
i s c o n s i d e r a b l y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t shown by s t a t i s t i c s 
p o r t r a y i n g the number of o f f e n s e s known to the p o l i c e or 
the number of a r r e s t s : 
( 1 ) Organized crime t a k e s about t w i c e as much income from 
gambling and otrier i l l e g a l goods and s e r v i c e s as c r i m i n a l s 
d e r i v e from a l l o t h e r k i n d s of c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y comP)ined. 
( 2 ) Unreported, commercial t h e f t l o s s e d , i n c l u d i n g s h o p l i f t i n g 
and employee t h e f t , a r e more th a n double those of a l l 
r e p o r t e d p r i v a t e a.nd commercial t h e f t s . 
( 3 ) Of the r e p o r t e d c r i m e s , w i l l f u l homicide, though 
comparativel.y low i n volume, .yields t h most c o s t l y 
e s t i m a t e s among those l i s t e d i n the UCn Ind e x . 
( 4 ) A l i s t of the seven c r i m e s with the g r e a t e s t econ.;mic 
impact i n c l u d e s only two, w i l l f u l homicide and. l a r c e n y 
of .:$50 and over (reported, and u n r e p o r t e d ) , of the o f f e n s e s 
i n c l u d e d i.n. the crirae Index. 
( 5 ) Only a s m a l l p r o p o r t i o n of the money expended f o r c r i m i n a l 
j u s t i c e a g e n c i e s i s a l l o c a t e d tp r e h a b i l i t a t i v e orograms 
f o r c r i m i n a l s or f o r r e s e a r c h . ' 
Cost a n a l y s i s would a l s o put ot h e r c r i m e s t h a t a r p e a r w i t h g r e a t 
f r e q u e n c y i n p o l i c e s t a t i s t i c s i n a new and d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e . 
A c c o r d i n g to tae P r e s i d e n t ' s Commission, the number of r e p o r t e d 
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F i g u r e 7.--Economic Impact of Crimes and R e l a t e d E x p e n d i t u r e s 
( E s t i m a t e d i n M i l l i o n s of D o l l a r s ) 
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o f f e n s e s f o r these c r i m e s a c c o u n t s f o r l e s s than o n e - s i x t h of the 
e s t i m a t e d t o t a l d o l l a r l o s s f o r a l l p r o p e r t y c r i m e s . An even lower 
percentage would be c o n s t i t u t e d by the c a t e g o r i e s which i n c l u d e 
r o bbery, b u r g l a r y , l a r c e n y , and auto t h e f t , and lower s t i l l i f t h e r e 
were any a c c u r a t e way of e s t i m a t i n g the e x t r e m e l y l a r g e sums i n v o l v e d 
i n e x t o r t i o n , b l a c k m a i l , and o t h e r p r o p e r t y c r i m e s . The economic impact 
of many o t h e r c r i m e s i s d i f f i c u l t to a s s e s s . On the c o r p o r a t e l e v e l , 
the u l t i m a t e c o s t to the consumer cannot e a s i l y be d e s c r i b e d w i t h o u t 
f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n ; and l o s s e s due to p u b l i c f e a r of crime a r e 
v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e t o measure. 
Crime's economic impact must a l s o be measured i n i t s u l t i m a t e 
c o s t to s o c i e t y . The t a k i n g of a n o t h e r ' s w e a l t h c l a n d e s t i n e l y o f f e r s 
a d i f f i c u l t assessment problem. How can i t s socio-economic c o s t 
be measured so t h a t d e c i s i o n s can he made on how to a l l o c a t e r e s o u r c e s 
f o r p r e v e n t i o n ? I n a l e g a l s i t u a t i o n i n which g i f t s arp g i v e n f r e e l v , 
the economic f r o . t e r n l t y would l a b e l the s i t u a t i o n a s one i n which a 
t r a n s f e r payment had been made.^ '-'- I t would c o n s i d e r w e a l t h and 
Income not to have e i t h e r r i s e n or f a l l e n , e x c e p t i n one sense. I f -
the t o t a l u t i l i t y of the t r a n s f e r payment ( t h a t i n c l u d e s the u t i l i t y 
of t h a t which i s g i v e n but e x c l u d e s the u t i l i t y i n v o l v e d i n the a c t 
of g i v i n g ) i s laii-ger f o r the r e c e i v e r than f o r the g i v e r , aggregate 
income may be thought of to have r i s e n . I f i t i s s m a l l e r , we say 
assume t h a t aggregate income has f a l l e n . 
S i n c e the u t i l i t y of income f a l l s w i t h any r i s e i n the q u a n t i t y 
p o s s e s s e d , i t i s sometimes thought t h a t aggregate r e a l income w i l l 
r i s e i f t r a n s f e r paynients a r e made from the r i c h to the poor a l a 
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Robin Hood. The f a c t t h a t the t r a n s f e r payment i s o u t s i d e the 
31 . 
bounds of l e g a l a c t i v i t y should have no b e a r i n g on i t s u t i l i t y . A 
c l a n d e s t i r a e t r a n s f e r payment (any form of f r a u d , t h i e v e r y , e t c . ) can 
be c o n s i d e r e d s o c i a l l y c o s t l y or g a i n f u l depending on whether the 
mean income of the d e f r a u d e r or t h i e f i s l e s s or more than the mean 
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income of the v i c t i m . 
A c l a n d e s t i m e t r a n s f e r payment, as i t was d e s c r i b e d , i s c l e a r l y 
s o c i a l l y c o s t l y . Tne l o s s of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y i n 
t h i s manner i s l i k e a 100% t a x on t h a t f r a c t i o n which i s t a k e n , 
the m a t h e m a t i c a l l y expected t a x r a t e b e i n g ICQ times the p r o b a b i l i t y 
t h a t i t w i l l occur. A l s o , l e s s iracome may be produced throughout 
the economy as a d i r e c t r e s u l t . The u n c e r t a i n t y c f r e t e n t i o n of 
p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y ( i n s e c u r i t y of p r e v e n t i o n ) i s the c a u s a l f a c t o r h e r e . 
Some q u a n t i t y of time which might o t h e r w i s e by expended i n income-
g e n e r a t i n g a c t i v i t i e s would now be spent i n o t h e r ways as an e f f e c t 
of the c l i m a t e of f e a r . While t h i s time element may go u n n o t i c e d , 
the o v e r a l l output of goods i n the economy c o u l d be made s m a l l e r by 
some iaeasurable increme,at.^-^ 
Then, too, the u n c e r t a i n t y of who w i l l s u f f e r has proven i t s e l f 
c o s t l y to sO'ie, but a l u c r a t i v e endeavor to o t h e r s . P r e c a u t i o n s 
ar e t a k e n to t r e v e n t t h e f t through the purchase of s a f e s , v a u l t s , 
s a f e t y - d e p o s i t boxes, m i r r o r s , s e r v i c e of guards, a c c u m u l a t i o n of 
i n f o r m a t i o n to p r o t e c t o n e s e l f a g a i n s t f r a u d , and s e r v i c e s of 
a c c o u n t a n t s to defend a g a i n s t embezzlement. One cannot o v e r l o o k 
the p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e uses to these c o s t s . 
Crime c o s t s can be measured, too, i n the aggreg'te l o s s of 
p r o d u c t i v e l a b o r . While no a c c u r a t e f i g u r e can be developed as to 
the probable amount of economic l o s s of t h i s s o r t c h a r g e a b l e to the 
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d i v e r s i o n from p r o d u c t i v e c h a n n e l s of the p o t e n t i a l man-power of 
c r i m i n a l s , the amount i s u n q u e s t i o n a h l y l a r g e c o n s i d e r i n g our 
overcrowded p r i s o n system,. At the same time, no f l . v u r e s can 
a c c u r a t e l y be developed as to the l o s s of l a b o r i n c i d e n t to the 
defense of c r i m i n a l s i n c o u r t , i n c l u d i n g c o s t s of j u r o r s and w i t n e s s e s . 
N e i t h e r can the b u s i n e s s of i n s u r i n g a g a i n s t crime nor the l o s s of 
l a b o r and materia.ls used i n the manufacture of crirae p r e v e n t i o n 
d e v i c e s be a s c e r t a i n e d i n any f e a s i b l e m a n n e r . I n the case of 
p r i s o n e r s and law enforcement o f f i c e s , however, some g e n e r a l i d e a of 
the order of magnitude of l o s s can be worked out. D e t a i l e d monetary 
f i g u r e s a r e used p r i m a r i l y f o r i l l u s t r a t i v e purposes, e x c e p t i n 
c a s e s of some s p e c i f i c c l a s s e s of c o s t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y c e r t a i n a s p e c t s 
of the c o s t of c r i m i n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
Once a g a i n the q u e s t i o n must be r a i s e d c o n c e r n i n g the optimum 
combination of crime c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s . I n a t t e m p t i n g to answer 
t h i s q u e s t i o n we must keep i ^ mind, t h a t our p o l i c e and c c u r t system 
do not c o n t i t u t e the onlv u n i v e r s e of crime p r e v e n t e r s . I n p r i n c i p l e , 
t e a c h e r s , s c h o o l s , c h u r c h e s , and a l l other s o c i a l c o n t r o l i n s t i t u t i o n s 
t h a t espouse some type of moral and obedience i n s t r u c t i o n should be 
i n c l u d e d . These, a l o ng w i t h m e c h a n i c a l d e v i c e s of i n c r e a s e d technology 
should be combined i n s p e c i f i c p r o p o r t i o n s to o p t i m a l l y minimize 
both the amount of crime and the c o s t of p r e v e n t i o n . However t h i s 
p o s i t i o n can o n l y be a t t a i n e d i f the p o s i t i o n of e q u i m a r g i n a l i t y i s 
a t t a i n e d . C osts would them be minimized i f the e x p e n d i t u r e f o r 
each a s p e c t of a p a r t i c u l a r s t r a t e g y would p r e v e n t the same number of 
o f f e n s e s . One can see then, t h a t i f t h i s p o s i t i o n i s not a t t a i n e d , 
t h a t i t would indeed pay s o c i e t y to r e a l l o c a t e the r e s o u r c e s a t i t s 
d i s p o s a l , 
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The c o s t of crime can be assumed to be tha a c t u a l sum of 
s u c c e s s f u l l y co'isummated crirae and the c o s t s of crime p r e v e n t i o n . 
T h i s i s t r u e d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t these two sums a r e i n v e r s e l y 
p r o p o r t i o n a l i n a s e n s e — t h e h i g h e r the c o s t of crirae p r e v e n t i o n , 
the l a r g e r the q u a n t i t y of r e s o u r c e s eraployed i n o r e v e n t i o n s t r a t e g i e 
the ( s u p p o s e d l y ) l a r g e r the amount of prevented c r i r a e , the s r a a l l e r 
the amount oi' s u c c e s s f u l l y c a r r i e d out c r i r a e , and t h e r e f o r e trie 
c o s t s of completed c r i m e s would be s m a l l e r , 
T h i s would seem to be a p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n of what should 
happen. Some sou r c e s contend, however, t h a t even though t h i s 
i n v e r s e r e l a t i o n e x i s t s i n t h e o r y , the a c t u a l crime r a t e has been 
on the r i s e as i t s c o s t to the t a x p a y e r has indeed t r i p l e d i n an 
e l e v e n y e a r time span and i s s t i l l rising. ' - ^ ' 7 The amount s c e n t on 
p o l i c e , c o u r t s , and p e n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , i n the f i s c a l y e ar ending 
June 3 0 , i 9 6 0 was $ 3 . 5 b i l l i o n ; and i n 1 9 7 1 . the t o t a l was more than 
410 b i l l i o n . ' Although i n some c i t i e s the a d d i t i o n a l e x p e n d i t u r e s 
d i d begin to m i l d l y d e c l i n e from t h e i r p r e v i o u s " - i l l time h i g h s , " 
t h e r e i s no r e l i e f i n s i g h t f o r the t a x p a y e r , who bears the brunt 
of e n l a r g e d p o l i c e departments and c o u r t systems as w e l l as r i s i n g 
pay s c a l e s . 
F i g u r e 8. , 
HOW COSTS aRE SOaHINcA^ 
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Crime Spending T o t a l s 
F i g u r e 9.--Who Puts up Money50 
T o t a l A l l Govexnments 1 0 . 1 b i l l i o n 
A r a t h e r i n t e r e s t i n g t a b l e p r e s e n t e d i n the UCPI each y e a r i s a 
s t a t e by s t a t e comparison of a n t i c r i m e spending. With d a t a of t h i s 
s o r t you can get a g e n e r a l i d e a of where your s t a t e stands on a 
n a t i o n a l s c a l e . The f i g u r e s c i t e d , i n c l u d e spending by s t a t e and 
l o c a l governments w i t h f e d e r a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n s i n c l u d e d . For the 
e n t i r e U n i t e d S t a t e s , the b i l l t o t a l «as n e a r l y $ 8.6 b i l l i o n i n 
1 9 6 9 , or a p p r o x i m a t e l y $42.20 per person. T a b l e s 5 and 6 a r e i n c l u d e d 
on the f o l l o w i n g page. 
Such d a t a a s these a s to crime c o s t s f u r n i s h no r e a l and d i r e c t 
a i d i n the s o l u t i o n of problems of law enforcement. rt-scertaining the 
f a c t s as to the econ.aGic e f f e c t s of crime and as to the f i n a n c i a l 
a s p e c t s of c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e i s merely one of the s t e p s necessuiry 
i n order to make i t p o s s i b l e to surve« the problem of crime a s a 
whole, f i g u r e s cannot t r u l y be determined w i t h uny i o t a of a c c u r a c v , 
but we may s a f e l y assume t h a t t h e i r magnitude i s of enormous p r o p o r t i o n 
From a p u r e l y economic s t a n d p o i n t then, e f f e c t i v e and adeauate crime 
c o n t r o l i s ' f the utmost importance. 
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T a b l e ^.--(onv S t a t e ' s A n t i c r i m e S r e n d i n g ^ l 
( Y e a r ended June 3 0 , 1 9 7 0 ) 
S t a t e 
Spending 
' T o t a l 
( p o l i c e , 
c o u r t s , 
p r i s o n s ) 
Spend i n g / 
Person 
S t a t e 
Spendinsc 
T o t a l 
( p o l i c e , 
c o u r t s , 
p r i s o n s ) 
Spending/ 
Person 
D.C 1 0 8 . 5 1 4 3 . 3 0 M i s s o u r i . 1 3 9 . 9 2 9 . 7 0 
s . c . 49.9 9 2 . 1 0 Minn. 104. 7 2 7 . 5 0 
A l a s . 21.2 7 0 . 1 0 N.C. 1 3 4 . 8 2 6 . 5 0 
Nev. 3 3 . 3 6 8 . 0 0 Maine 2 6 . 1 2 6 . 3 0 
N. Y. 1 1 8 7 . 2 6 5 . 1 0 L o u i s . 9 5 . 4 26.20 
C a l i f . 1171 .2 58.70 M ont. 1 7 . 8 2 5 . 7 0 
Md. 1 8 9 . 6 48. 30 Texas 2 8 3 . 2 2 5 . 3 0 
D e l . 2 6 . 2 4 7 . 9 0 Iowa 6 9 . 6 2 4 . 6 0 
Haw. 3 5 . 9 46. 60 Kansas 5 5 . 3 2 4 . 6 0 
N.J. 313 .7 4 3 . 8 0 Tenn. 9 6 . 1 2 4 . 5 0 
Mass. 240 . 3 4 2 . 2 0 V i r . / 1 1 3 . 2 2 4 . 3 0 
1 1 1 . 444.1 4 0 . 0 0 Ga. 111.4 24 . 3 0 
A r i z . 7 0 . 0 3 9 . 5 0 Idaho 1 7 . 2 24 . 2 0 
Wash. 128.1 3 7 . 6 0 Utah 2 5 . 3 2 3 . 9 0 
7 Conn. 1 1 3 . 6 3 7 . 5 0 Neb. 2 4 . 6 2 3 . 30 
Greg. 7 7 . 5 3 7 . 5 0 O k l a . 5 8 . 2 22.80 
Wis. l 6 o . 0 3 6 . 2 0 S.D. 14 . 7 2 2 . 1 0 
Mich. 3 1 0 . 8 3 6 . 0 0 Kent. 70 .7 2 2 . 0 0 
F l a . 2 3 9 . 1 3 5 . 2 0 N.H. 1 5 . 9 2 1 . 5 0 
Colo. 73.1 3 3 . 1 0 I n d . 1 1 1 . 1 21.40 
H . l . 31.2 3 2 . 9 0 A l a . 68.2 19.80 
Pa. 386.1 3 2 . 7 0 S.C. 4 9 . 9 1 9 . 3 0 
Ohio 3^45.0 32.40 Miss. 4 0 . 1 18 . 1 0 
N. Max. 32 . 8 32.40 W. Va. 2 9 . 2 16.80 
Ver. 1 3 . 8 3 1 . 1 0 Ark. 2 7 . 3 14 . 2 0 
Wyo . 1 0 . 0 3 0 . 1 0 U.S. 7 5 9 2 . 8 37.40 
Note: f i g u r e s i n c l u d e spending by S t a t e and l o c a l governments w i t h 
F e d e r a l Government i n c l u d e d , t o t a l U.S. was n e a r l y S8.6 
b i l l i o n , or $42.2 0 per person. 
Table 6.—Law Enforcement C o s t s $8.6 B i l l i o n ^ 
P o l i c e ( F e d e r a l , s t a t e , l o c a l ) $ 5 . 0 
Penal System 1.8 
Court System 1.8 
T o t a l take by o r g a n i z e d crime from i l l e g a l goods & s e r v i c e s 
Crimes a g a i n s t -Droperty & b u s i n e s s ( e x c l u d i n g org. c r i m e ) 
Other c r i m e s 
Law enforcement c o s t s 
P r i v a t e crime c o s t s ( c o s t of s e r v i c e s & equipment) 
t o t a l crime expenses 
1 9 . 7 
1 3 . 1 
4.2 
8.6 
5 1 . 1 
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The c o s t of a d m i n i s t e r i n g c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e , w h i l e l a r g e , i s 
of l e s s economic impact than the l o s s e s i n f l i c t e d by the c r i m i n a l . 
I t seems of much more economic importance to s o c i e t y to i n c r e a s e the 
e f f i c i e n c y of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e t h a n to decrease 
i t s c o s t s . True economy i n a d m i n i s t e r i n g the c r i m i n a l law may v e r y 
w e l l r e q u i r e a m a t e r i a l and perhaps s u b s t a n t i a l i n c r e a s e i n 
e x p e n d i t u r e s f o r e n f o r c i n g the law i n order to secure i n c r e a s e d 
e f f i c i e n c y and d e a l a d e q u a t e l y with the problem of cr i m e ; and 
u n f o r t u n a t e l y the t a x p a y e r s w i l l p robably f e e l i t most s h a r p l y . 
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H I . AN ECONOMIC MODEL FOR CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 
Almost the e n t i r e body of l i t e r a t u r e c o n c e r n i n g crirainolosty 
s uggests t h a t crime i s a s o c i o l o g i c a l phenomenon. However, the I d e a 
has been forwarded t h a t , a t l e a s t i n p a r t , crime i s a d i r e c t response 
to economic c o n d i t i o n s , 5 3 as measured by job s e c u r i t y , income l e v e l s , 
and the r a t e of unemployment. But even i n those s t u d i e s which use 
economic v a r i a b l e s i n t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n s of c r i m i n a l b e h a v i o r , the 
b a s i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e u s u a l l y s e t i n terms of s o c i o l o g i c a " ! t h e o r y . 
S e v e r a l s o u r c e s have agreed t h a t t h e r e a r e indeed c r i m e s which 
are economic i n n a t u r e . There i s one grouping of crime which i s 
c o n s i d e r e d almost e n t i r e l v economic, and t s i s i n c l u d e s c r i m e s of a n t i -
t r u s t , f a l s e a d v e r t i s i n g , and o t h e r f i n a n c i a l m a n i p u l a t i o n s . F u r t h e r , 
D a n i e l Hell5'^'' has suggested t h a t some cr i m e s a r e a resnonse to the 
American d e s i r e of economic g a i n as a measure of s u c c e s s i n cer!"ain 
groups i n s o c i e t v . 
The i d e a s forwarded by men such as B e l l l e d a young man by the 
name of David S j o q u l s t to examine the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t som,e cr i m e s 
may be e x p l a i n a b l e t o t a l l y by economic theory.-^'^ I n a p a r e r sponsored 
by the N a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e of Law Enforcement and C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e , 
S j o q u l s t exaiaines t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y t h o r o u g h l y and comprehensibly 
u s i n g d a t a c o n c e r n i n g the c r i m e s of robbery, l a r c e n y , and auto t h e f t . 
The hvp.'-thesls t e s t e d was whether, under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s , c r i m i n a l s 
may be t r e a t e d as economic beings and behave i n much the same 
economic manner as any o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l mB.king a r a t i o n a l , economic 
d e c i s i o n under c o n d i t i o n s of r i s k . The approach he used f o l l o w e d 
c l o s e l y the a n a l y s i s of b e h a v i o r under r i s k as p r e s e n t e d by Friedman 
and Savage.^' I n the f a l l o w i n g pages, 1 w i l l atterapt to summarize 
38 
3 j o q u i s t ' s endeavor. 
As suggested, i n "Crime and Funlshment: An Economic Approach," 
Gary Becker, i n o r d e r to r e l a t e the amount of c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y and 
the c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system, develops a t h e i r e t i c a l model to a n a l y z e 
the r e l a t i v e c o s t s of each. I n e s s e n c e , he uses the economic t h e o r y 
of b e h a v i o r under r i s k to a i d i n h i s a n a l y s i s . 5 7 TQ determine the 
amount of c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y , Becker " f o l l o w s the economist's u s u a l 
a n a l y s i s of c h o i c e and assumes t h a t a person commits an o f f e n s e 
i f the expected u t i l i t y to him exceeds the u t i l i t y y i e lded, by u s i n g 
h i s time a.nd o t h e r r e s o u r c e s a t o t h e r ac c i v i t i e s . " 5 8 Thus h i s 
parameters i n d e t e r m i n i n g the amount of crime i n c l u d e the p r o b a b i l i t y 
of c o n v i ' ^ t i o n , the type of punishment i f c o n v i c t e d , lncom.e, and the 
w i l l i n g n e s s to commit c r i m e . 
S j o q u l s t ' s h y p o t h e s i s and t e s t i n g f o l l o w much of the same l i n e s . 
I n a g i v e n amount of time, and. i n d i v i d u a l i s f r e e to choose the 
a c t i v i t i e s to f i l l up t h a t time. I f we can assume the two a l t e i ' m a t i v e 
c h o i c e s to be between l i g a l and i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s , the l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s 
have two dimensions, work and l e i s u r e , w h i l e f o r purposes of d i s c u s s i o n , 
the i l l e g a l i s assumed to have onl.y one, c r i m e s a g a i n s t propert.y. 
L e i s u r e i s e.xpected to r e s u l t i n onlv p s y c h i c g a i n , w h i l e work 
i s assumed to y i e l d f i n a n c i a l reward.. I f work and l e i s u r e a r e e q u a l l y 
valued a t the margi", the net g a i n per a d d i t i o n a l u n i t of t H e from 
l e g a l a c t i v i t y c a n be measured. The t o t a l g a i n an i n d i v i d u a l would 
e x p e r i e n c e from l e g a l a c t i v i t y would then depend upon the wage r a t e 
and the time a l l o t e d to t h a t a c t i v i t y . The g a i n s r e s u l t i n g form 
i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y would t h e n depend upon the wage r a t e and the time 
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a l l o t e d to t h a t a c t i v i t y . The g a i n s r e s u l t i n g from i l l e g a l s o r t s 
of a c t i v i t i e s a r e t w o f o l d . A p s y c h i c g a i n i s e x p e r i e n c e d from h a v i n g 
o u t w i t t e d or out-smarted o t h e r s and "g o t t e n away" as w e l l as t h e r e 
being monetary g a i n s i n the obvious f i n a n c i a l rewards p o t e n t i a l . F o r 
S j o q u l s t ' s p u r c o s e s , he assumed the c s y c h i c g a i n to measured by " t h a t 
q u a n t i t y of money ivhich the i n d i v i d u a l i s w i l l i n g to pay to o b t a i n 
the p s y c h i c g a i n . " 5 9 
As w i t h l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s , the f i n a n c i a l g a i n s r e s u l t i n g from 
i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s can be d i r e c t l y computed from the d o l l s - r v a l u e 
to the c r i m i n a l of the goods s t o l e n ; however, the magnitude of t h i s 
f i g u r e i s l e f t p u r e l y to chance. An i n d i v i d u a l u n d e r t a k i n g t h i s 
s o r t of endeavor would n o r m a l l y have some i d e a of the f i n a n c i a l 
g a i n s which would be i n v o l v e d , depending on the age or apparent 
s o c i a l s t a t u s of t h i s v T c t i m ; but a l l i n a l l , the expected f i n a n c i a l 
g a i n from i l l e g a l a c t ' v i t v i s a f u n c t i o n of the time s c e n t i n the 
a c t i v i t y and the p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n of the p o s s i b l e g a i n s . 
T h i s can be noted f u r t h e r by e x a m i n a t i o n of Table 7 . ^ ^ 
Table 7 . 
I n d i v i d u a l d o l l a r l o s s e s from t h e f t s which o c c u r r e d on F r i d a y , December 
9, and S a t u r d a y , December l o , I 9 6 6 , i n wash., D.C, and were r e p o r t e d to 
the p o l i c e . (The source d i d not d e f i n e " t h e f t " but i t i s thought to 
i n c l u d e r o b b e r i e s , b u r g l a r i e s and l a r c e n i e s . ) 
T h e f t # $ L o s s T h e f t # 1 L o s s T h e f t # 4 L o s s 
' 1 . 2. 1 3 . 1400. 2 5 . 2 3 . 
2. 1 5 0 0 . 1 ^ . 5 . 26. 2 5 . 
3 . 3 . 15. 1 0 0 . 2 7 . . 75 
4. 2100. 1 6 . 2 F 9 . 5 0 28. 80. 
5. 1 3 9 . 17. 120. 2 9 . 20. 
6. 92. 18. 59. 50 3 0 . 3 . 
7. 8716. 1 9 . 175 . 3 1 . 3 0 0 . 
8. 5. 20. 40. 3 2 . 80. 
9. 3 0 . 21 . 3 . 3 3 . 200. 
1 0 . 2 5 . 2 2 . 5 1 . 3 4 . 2 5 . 
1 1 . 6 1 . 2 3 . 1 9 . 
1 2 . 0, 2'i-. 
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Another i n t e r e s t i n g assumption S j o q u i s t makes concerns the c o s t s 
which a r i s e i n l i k e manner whether one engages i n l e g a l or i l l e g a l 
a c t i v i t i e s . The c o s t s i n c l u d e expenses f o r s c h o o l i n g , t o o l s , and 
equipment. F u r t h e r , the assumption i s made thait w h i l e t h e r e a r e 
(presumably) no p s y c h i c c o s t s i n v o l v e d w i t h l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s , t h e r e 
a r e w i t h those of an i l l e g a l n a t u r e . A r r e s t and c o n v i c t i o n y i e l d 
the p s y c h i c c o s t s of l o s s of p r e s t i g e and s c a n d a l . I f a c o n v i c t i o n 
t a k e s p l a c e , p r o b a t i o n ma.v r e s u l t , the p s y c h i c c o s t of which i n c l u d e s 
time and i n c o n v e n i e n c e as w e l l a s c o u r t r e s t r i c t i o n on one's a c t i v i t i e s . 
The v a l u e g i v e n these p s y c h i c c o s t s i s t h a t amount of money h a v i n g an 
e q u i v a l e n t v a l u e to the i n d i v i d u a l as the c o s t . F i n a n c i a l c o s t s a r i s e 
from l e g a l f e e s and r e d u c t i o n i n p o t e n t i a l e a r n i n g s r e s u l t i n g from a 
c r i m i n a l r e c o r d . Imprisonment r e s u l t s i n l o s s of e a r n i n g s , measured 
by the d i s c o u n t e d v a l u e of income forgone w h i l e i n p r i s o n l e s s any 
b e n e f i t s r e c e i v e d , such as v o c a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g . 
Another s i g n i f i c a n t assumption i s t h a t the p s y c h i c and f i n a n c i a l 
c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h c o n v i c t i o n and a r r e s t a r e q u a s i - f i x e d c o s t s , 
t h a t i s , i f a r r e s t e d and c o n v i c t e d , the c o s t i s the same r e g a r d l e s s 
of the a c t u a l am-ount of time the i n d i v i d u a l has spent i n h i s i l l e g a l 
a c t i v i t i e s . As S j o q u i s t s u g g e s t s , these q u a s i - f i x e d c o s t s may be 
the most Important component of the c o s t of i l l e g a l a c t i v i t v . I f 
t h i s were t r u e , then were the l e n g t h o f • t h e sentence i n c r e a s e d f o r 
a g i v e n c r i m e , the t o t a l c o s t to the c r i m i n a l a t t h i s p o i n t x-xould 
o n l y be i n c r e a s e d by a s m a l l p e r c e n t . The net e f f e c t , then, would 
be t h a t v a r i a t i o n s i n the l e n g t h of the sentence would have l i t t l e 
r e a l e f f e c t on the amount of time an i n d i v i d u a l spent i n i l l e g a l 
a c t i v i t i e s . 
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I n our model, I t has been assumed t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s have a s u b j e c t i v e 
e v a l u a t i o n of the p r o b a b i l i t i e s of a r r e s t , c o n v i c t i o n , and i m p r i s o n -
ment, and these w i l l be assumed to be the sum of a q u a s i - f i x e d component 
and a v a r i a b l e component. The l a t t e r f i g u r e i s assumed to depend upon 
the time spent i n i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y ( t h e t h e o r y behind t h i s b e i ng, the 
more time spent, the g r e a t e r the l i k e l i h o o d of a r r e s t and. c o n v i c t i o n ) . 
R e l a t i v e g a i n s and c o s t s from l e g a l and i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s a r e e v a l u a t e d 
i n d i v i d u a l l y by each person a c c o r d i n g to h i s p r e f e r e n c e o r d e r i n g . 
Von Neuman and Morgenster.n, i n t h e i r book. The Theory of Games 
and Economic Be h a v i o r , s e t f o r t h the f o l l o w i n g h y p o t h e s i s : i n a 
s i t u a t i o n i n v o l v i n g r i s k , the c h o i c e an i n d i v i d u a l w i l l make between 
a l t e r n a t i v e s w i l l be an attempt to maximize the expected, u t i l i t y 
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v a l u e . Among a l l the u t i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s , xwhich d e s c r i b e p r e f e r e n c e s , 
a s i n g l e one can be a t t a i n e d which can be predicted, through c a l c u l a t i o n s 
of the expected, u t i l i t y of the a l t e r n a t i v e s , assuming t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l 
i s a t t e m p t i n g to maximize h i s expected, u t i l i t y . When such a u t i l i t y 
f u n c t i o n has been a s c e r t a i n e d , a l i n e a r f u n c t i o n w i l l s e r v e the same 
purpose. I n S j o q u l s t ' s model, the u t i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s seem to f o l l o w 
the Neuman-Morgenstern axioms. 
F i n a n c i a l and, ps.ychic c o s t s a r e measured, i n the same u n i t s as 
a r e g a i n s . . One would e x p e c t , however, t h a t the d o l l a r v a l u e a s s o c i a t e d 
w i t h a r r e s t , c o n v i c t i o n , and imprisonment to be of a d i f f e r e n t s o r t 
t han the d o l l a r g a i n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h l e g a l and i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s . 
To c o u n t e r t h i s apparent d i s c r e p a n c y , S j o q u l s t uses an a d d i t i v e u t i l i t v 
f u n c t i o n such t h a t the d i s u t i l i t y of a r r e s t , c o n v i c t i o n , and punishment 
i s independent of the g a i n from l e g a l and i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y . T h i s 
•assumption pla.ces s t r o n g r e s t r i c t i o n s on the r e s u l t i n v p r e f e r e n c e 
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o r d e r l n g s . The i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t i f the s l o p e s of the i n d i f f e r e n c e 
c u r v e s a r e observed a t two p o i n t s , the whole f i e l d can be determined 
through e x t r a p o l a t i o n . I t seems l i k e l y , though, t h a t the d i s t a s t e 
f o r a r r e s t and imprisonment would not change, even i f a l a r g e r 
g a i n were r e c e i v e d from e i t h e r l e g a l or i l l e v a l a c t i v i t i e s . T h i s i s 
not to iiri.ply t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l ' s w i l l i n g n e s s to s u f f e r a p r i s o n 
sentence w i l l not change, only t h a t h i s d i s t a s t e f o r p r i s o n does not 
change. 
The Formal Model: 
The f o r m a l model S j o q u i s t has f o r m u l a t e d makes d e t a i l e d use of 
the p r e c e e d i n g assumptions i n m a t h e m a t i c a l form. L e t t i n g t ^ r e p r e s e n t 
the t o t a l time i n the period, under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t ^ and w i l l 
r e p r e s e n t the time a l l o c a t e d r e s p e c t i v e l y to l e g a l and i l l e g a l 
a c t i v i t i e s where tQ=t]_+t2. 
The net g a i n from l e g a l a c t i v i t . y , g^, i s a f u n c t i o n of t2 , 8^ = 
g^ ( t p ) , where the g a i n I n c r e a s e s a.t a c o n s t a n t or d e c r e a s i n g r a t e . 
T h e r e f o r e , 
T h i s g a i n i s generated, w i t h c e r t a i n t y w i t h a l l a s s o c i a t e d c o s t s 
i n c l u d e d i n gp. 
I f we assume t e m p o r a r i l y t h a t the net g a i n from, i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s . 
d g i ( t i ) d^gpCtp) 
0. 
6 3 
g2, i s g e n e r a t e d w i t h c e r t a i n t y and i s s o l e l y a f u n c t i o n of t^, a l l 
c o s t s o t h e r than those a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a r r e s t , c o n v i c t i o n , and 
punishment being included, i n g2. T h e r e f o r e , 82^=52^^2^ where the g a i n 
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would I n c r e a s e as more time i s spent i f t h a t a c t i v i t . y , hut i n c r e a s e s 
a t a c o n s t a n t or d e c r e a s i n g r a t e , or 
dgoCt^) ^ d^g ( t ) 64 
_ _ 1 _ > 0 , and l _ J _ / 0 . 
dtg d t ^ ^ — 
L a t e r the assumption of c e r t a i n t y w i l l be dropped and the e f f e c t on 
the model w i l l be shown of h a v i n g g2 d i s t r i b u t e d a c c o r d i n g to a 
f r e q u e n c y f u n c t i o n . 
I f we assume ( t e m p o r a r l l . y ) t h a t the r r o b a b i l i t y of c o n v i c t i o n 
and punishment cond.itioned on a r r e s t as one, the j o i n t p r o b a b i l i t . y 
of a r r e s t , c o n v i c t i o n , and punishment w i l l e q u a l the p r o b a b i l i t y of 
a r r e s t , ( L a t e r t h i s too w i l l be d.ropped and e f f e c t s on a n a l y s i s of 
t r e a t i n g each p r o b a b i l i t y s e p a r a t e l y shown.) I f r i s s e t to r e p r e s e n t 
the p r o b a b i l i t y of a r r e s t , c o n v i c t i o n , and runashment ( t h a t i s , the 
p r o b a b i l i t y of i n c u r r i n g f i n a n c i a l and p s y c n i c c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h 
a r r e s t , c o n v i c t i o n , and punishment), and r i s a f u n c t i o n of t ^ and 
r * i s a q u a s i - f i x e d r i s k , t h e n 
C=0 i f t2=0 
V>0 and conf 
r = r * + r ( t 2 ) , where r'* 
c o n s t a n t i f t2>0, 
r w i l l i n c r e a s e as t2 i n c r e a s e s , thus 
d 2 r ( t ^ ) 
> 0 , 
and assume 
dt2 
d ^ r ( t H 6 5 
" ^ 2 ^ , 
I f we a c c e p t the above assumption c o n c e r n i n g r we can then combine 
a l l the c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a r r e s t , c o n v i c t i o n , and punishment. 
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S j o q u i s t s e p a r a t e s these c o s t s , p, i n t o q u a s i - f i x e d c o s t s , p''S and 
v a r i a b l e c o s t s , p ( t ^ ) , so 
p=p-;f-+p( ) , where p"" 
=0 i f t2=0 
>0 and c o n s t a n t i f t2'>0. 
He assumes then t h a t 
2 
dp(t..) ^ d p ( t ) 
y 0 and 2 < 0. 66 
dt2 dt2 ~ 
Based on the assumption t h a t the d l s u t l i t y of p i S Independent 
of g and g , the expected t o t a l u t i l i t y z i s g i v e n as 1 2 
z - u ( g ^ ( t ^ ) + g 2 ( t 2 ) ) - ( r * + r ( t 2 ) ) - v ( p * + ( t 2 ) ) , '^^  
where u (gp ( t ^ )+g2 ( t g )) r e p r e s e n t s the " o r d i n a l " u t i l i t y from the g a i n s , 
and v ( p * + p ( t 2 ) ) r e p r e s e n t s the " o r d i n a l " u t i l i t y from, p.^^ His c h o i c e 
of i n i t i a l v a l u e s of the i n d i c a t o r i s a r b i t r a r y s i n c e i n d i c a t o r s , 
a c c o r d i n g to h i s s o u r c e s , a r e unique up to a l i n e a r t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . 
Assuming the m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y of money to be p o s i t i v e and e i t h e r 
c o n s t a n t c r d e c r e a s i n g , the i m p l i c f c i t i o n i s t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l i s 
e i t h e r r i s k n e u t r a l or r i s k a v e r s e r e s p e c t i v e l y , or 
2 
du(g,+g^) d u ( g +g ) 69 
^ ^ 0, and 1 2 ^ 0. 
d(g^+g2) ' d T i ^ + i j T — 
S j o q u i s t a l s o assumes t h a t 
• " ^ l A J i i . > 
:0. 
d.u(p) ^ d ^ v ( p ) rt 
dp / 0 , and d p2 x ( 
The U t i l i t y F u n c t i o n : 
I f B r e p r e s e n t s a c o n s t a n t l e v e l of u t i l i t y i n t h i s model, 
then B would r e p r e s e n t an in(] i f f erence curve between t and. t 2 , the 
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c o n s t r a i n i n g f o r c e being t^=t.+tp. I t was noted p r e v i o u s l y t h a t s 
i s a s e p a r a b l e u t l l i t j ' f u n c t i o n , "''d The type of u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n 
g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e i s of the f orm*f =f ( x )+g( .y ) 
w hich i s maximized s u b j e c t to the c o n s t r a i n t i=T-^x+'^2^' where I i s 
income a n d a n d T 2 a^e r e s p e c t i v e p r i c e s . The u t i l i t y index employed 
here i s of the form / = u ( t p , t 2 ) - v ( t 2 ) and s u b j e c t to the c o n s t r a i n t 
tQ=tp+t2. But i t can a l s o be e x p r e s s e d i n the f o r m y = F ( g p + g 2 ) - G ( p ) , 
maximized s u b j e c t to the c o n s t r a i n t on (gp+gg) and p, and u l t i m a t e l y 
on tp and t2 s i n c e (gp+g2) and p a r e f u n c t i o n s of tp and ^-2'^^ 
As (gp+gg) i n c r e a s e s , then, by assumption t h e r e s hould be no 
change i n the u t i l i t y of p. I n t h i s sense {g-^+g^) and p should, be 
c o n s i d e r e d i..ndepend.ent and the i n d i f f e r e n c e r e l a t i o n between them 
s u b j e c t to the Samuelson l i m i t a t i o n s . ' ' ' ^ An a l t e r a t i o n i n the c h a r a c t e r 
of both (gp+gg) and p o c c u r s , however, w i t h an i n c r e a s e i n t 2 . Thus 
i f the c o n s t r a i n t changes ar e known as t changes, the whole s e t of 
o 
i n d i f f e i e n c e c u r v e s can be determined. 7 3 
I f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between (gp+gg) and p i s d i r e c t l y i n c o r p o r a t e d 
i n t o tne u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n r a t h e r than the c o n s t r a i n t , the i . n d i t f ere nee 
s e t i s s u b j e c t to the l i m i t a t i o n of an a d d i t i v e u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n a.nd 
s u b j e c t to the f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p of (gp+g^) and p to t1 
I f the t o t a l d i f f e r e n t i a l i s s e t to equal z e r o . 
1 nie. 7 4 
^ u(gp+g2 
dg=0= . d t ^ + 
T h e r e f o r e 
3 t -1 
dt2 
d t 
^uCgp+g^) • b ( r . v ( p ) ) 
^ t 2 
^u(g.^+g2 





S j o q u i s t h-'-s shown a l l of the p a r t i a l d e r i v a t i v e s to be p o s i t i v e , 
t h e r e f o r e the slope of the i n d i f f e r e n c e curve w i l l be n e g a t i v e i f and 
o n l y i f , 
77 ^ u ( s +Sp) ^ ( r . v ( p ) ) 
> 
or the m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y from the g a i n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h 13.1 e g a l a c t i v i t y 
must be g r e a t e r than the m a r g i n a l expected l o s s of u t i l i t y from a r r e s t , 
c o n v i c t i o n , and punishment. 
dt. 
As we d i f f e r e n t i a t e '2 
d t 




b u ( g p ^ g 2 ) ^ ( r . v ( p ) ) 2 ^^(gp+gg) ^(gp-t-g^) 
• ^ t 2 ^ t 2 
"^ulgp+gg) ^ ( r . v ( p ) " 2 ^uCgp+gg) ' ^ ( r . v ( p ) ) 2 
- ^ t 2 ^ t 2 - ^ t2 
and " b ^ C r . v l p ) ) 
So ^ u ( g ^ + g ^ ) 
= 0 
^^0(8^+82) " ^ ( r . v ( p ) ) ^uCg.+g^U 3)"<Sg'52' 
v a " l i a ^ ' : ~ 
+ 
gp ^ ( r . v ( p ) ) 78 
4? 
T h e r e f o r e 
d t 
dtp V ^ u ( g p + g 2 ) y ^ ( r . v ( p ) ) 
and ' ^ g j - ^ g 2 > d .^ Thus S j o q u i s t can i n f e r t h a t the \
i n d i f f e r e n c e c u r v e s 'ire convex. There 
^1 ^^2 
I s one d i s c o n t i n u i t y a t the p o i n t t-^O due to the q u a s i - f i x e d r i s k 
and c o s t . 
The c o n s t r a i n i n g l i n e nas a slope of - 1 , t h e r e f o r e , i f the 
c o n d i t i o n s f o r c o n v e x i t y h o l d , the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l m-xiniize h i s 
u t i l i t y a t the t a n g e n t i a l p o i n t of the i n d i f f e r e n c e c urve and budget 
l i n e ( r e f e r to F i g u r e 1 0 ) . At t h i s p o i n t 
'^u(gp+g2) i^(Si^®2^ ^ ( r . v ( p ) ) p 
= - • and t =t-,+t„. 
•hh i b ' hh 
The i n d i f f e r e n c e curve c o n s i s t s of l i n e A and p o i n t A, being 
d i s c o n t i n u o u s a t tg^O. M a x H i z a t i o n of expected u t i l i t y o c c u r s a t 
48 
p o i n t a. There a r e tiAjo p o s s i b l e s i t u a t i o n s i n x\fhich the e q x a l l i b r i u m 
p o i n t woule' occur a t t ^ = t ^ . I n the f i r s t , i f the slope of the 
i n d i f f e r e n c e c urve were l e s s t h a n -1 a t a l l p o i n t s , then because no 
i n t e r n a l t a n g e n c i e s would e x i s t , e q u i l i b r i u m would occur a t t ^ = t ^ . 
I n the second c a s e , even w i t h tne e x i s t e n c e of i n t e r n a l t a n g e n c i e s 
w i t h A, the p o i n t t p - t ^ w i l l be chosen i f p o i n t i\. l i e s to the l e f t 
of tpj=to (see F i g u r e 1 1 ) . Then t h e r e e x i s t s an i n d i f f e r e n c e s e t 
r e p r e s e n t i n g g r e a t e r u t i l i t y than p o i n t A, to tne l e f t of p o i n t A, 
a t tp=tQ. 
The E f f e c t of R i s k A l t e r a t i o n s : 
I n a s i t u a t i o n of i n c r e a s e d p o l i c e a c t i v i t y , the v a l u e of r would 
be i n c r e a s e d f o r e v e r y v a l u e of . By o b s e r v i n g the change i n the 
slope of the i n d i f f e r e n c e c u r v e , we can d.etermine how t h i s w i l l a f f e c t 
the amount of time an I n d i v i d u a l would spend i n i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y . 
P o i n t a of F i g u r e 10 i s the e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t i n d i s c u s s i o n . I f a 
new i n d i f f e r e n c e c u r v e had a slope which was a b s o l u t e l y g r e a t e r a t 
p o i n t a t h a i the i n d i f f e r e n c e curve of F i g u r e 10, the i m p l i c a t i o n i s 
t h a t t2 must d e c r e a s e w i t h the new r (see F i g u r e 1 2 ) . 
Figuoe 12. 83 F i a r e 13 8 4 
new 
i n d i f f e r e n c e 
c u rve 
new 
equ i 1 i brium 
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I f the slope of the new I n d i f f e r e n c e c u rve i s a b s o l u t e l y l e s s , t h en 
tg w i l l i n c r e a s e ( s e e F i g u r e 1 3 ) . 
P o i n t a i s not a f f e c t e d i n eithe-ir case because i t i s found by 
s e t t i n g t2=0, and hence r ( t 2 ) = 0 . The new r w i l l be r e p r e s e n t e d by 
R, then g=u(gp+g2)-Rv(p) 
and dt2 ^ u ( g i + g 2 ^ / ^ b ( g p + g 2 ) ^ ( H . v ( p ) ) 85 
dtp ^ "tp ^ ^^2 
Because t p , and t2 a r e measured a t p o i n t a i n both c a s e s , 
u(gp+g2) ^ u ( g +g2) 
and 
^ tp 6 ^ 2 
ar e the same i n both i n s t a n c e s . 
I f , as S j o q u i s t s u g g e s t s , we assume 
> S R . V ( p ) \^ r . v( p) ^ t 2 /
the i m p l i c a t i o n i s b R >v ^  r , and the slope of the new i n d i f f e r e n c e 
^ t 2 / ^ t 2 
cur v e w i l l be g r e a t e r t han the slope of the o r i g i n a l i n d i f f e r e n c e 
c u r v e . I n comparison of 
^u(g-|+g2) ^u(gp+g2) 
^ 1 , V 
to 
>)U(gp + S2) ^ ( n . v ( p ) ) ' ^u(g^+g2) ^ ( r . v ( p ) ) 
The f i n d i n g i s t h a t 
• ^ ^ ^ S I + S R ) ^u(gp+g2) 86 
\" 
" • ^ u i g p t g ^ ) _ ^ ( R . v ( p ) ) / ^ u ( g bg2) ^ T 7 2 ; ( 7 ) ) 
^^2 ^ t 2 / -2 d t.. 
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or t h a t the a b s o l u t e v a l u e s share the same r e l a t i o n s h i p . We can 
see, then, t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l would reduce the amount of time spent 
i n i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y as r i n c r e a s e s . I f i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s were not 
engaged i n r r i o r to the i n c r e a s e i n r , they xaould not afterward.s 
e i t h e r . I f P, the c o s t of i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y were i n c r e a s e d , the same 
r e s u l t would h o l d a s f o r an i n c r e a s e i n r , and the same would be t r u e 
f o r an i n c r e a s e i n gp or a de c r e a s e i n gg. 
Randomness i n the Cost of 13 l e g a l A c t i v i t y : 
L e t ' s consid.er now a v a r i a t i o n on the model i n which p r o b a b i l i t i e s 
of a r r e s t , c o n v i c t i o n , and punishment a r e t r e a t e d s e p a r a t e l y . I n 
such a c a s e , a=u( gp+g^ ) - r ^ ^ v l P^^'+P^C t2 ) ) - r ^ v ( P^^+P^( tg ) ) 
+ ( P ^ ^ + P ^ ( t 2 ) ) - r p ( p * + p ( t 2 ) ) 
i n which r ^ i s , t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of a r r e s t o n l ' , r . a r r e s t and c o n v i c t i o n 
o n l y , r a r r e s t , c o n v i c t i o n , and punishment o n l y , P * the q u a s i -p a 
f i x e d c o s t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a r r e s t , P,,* the q u a s i - f i x e d , c o s t a s s o c i a t e d 
c 
w i t h c o n v i c t i o n , and p^'^+pCt^) i s as e a r l i e r d e f i n e d . T h e r e f o r e , 
l-(r„+r +r ) i s the p r o b a b i l i t y of not being a r r e s t e d . ^ c p 
By assumption, S j o q u i s t s a y s t h a t 
r ( p * + p ( t 2 ) )=r^.Pj^+r^(P^+P^) + r^(p-*^+p(t2) ) and t h a t we can show 
t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l l o s e l e s s u t i l i t y from r P^+r (P +P ) + 
a a c' a c 
" (p*-+p(t2)) than from r ( p * + p ( t 2 ) ) , assuming he i s r i s k a v e r s e . 
A c c o r d i n g to the above e q u a t i o n we can o b t a i n 
p * + p ( t 2 ) = I a P^+rc (Pa+Pa)+££ ( p ^ + p ( t 2 ) ) 
r r r 
where 0 < £ a , £c , f j p ^ l s i n c e r >r,. , r , r . ^ 9 
r r r /• a c p 




w i l l p r e f e r /n income w i t h c e r t a i n t y a g a i n s t an income w i t h 
u n c e r t a i n t y , 9 0 qp expected v a l u e s and g a i n s a r e the same f o r both 
incomes. I t f e l l o w s t hen • 
v ( p * + p ( t 2 ) ) ^ I a v ( P ^ ) + £c v(P^+P^) + ^ v i p ^ + v i t ^ ) ) 
r r r 
and i f we m u l t i p l y by r , a p o s i t i v e number, 
p.:'ih f h r-! • ' p ' b p !"':*SLC 
• • r v ( p - " b p ( t 2 ) ) > r ^ v ( P ^ ) + r^viirp^+P^) 4- r ^ v ( p H p ( tg ) ) . 
T h e r e f o r e r . v( p-Hp( t ^ ) ) would generate g r e a t e r d i s u t i l i t y than 
r^^v(P^) + r^ v ( P ^ + P ^ ) + r p V C p ^ H p l t ^ ) ) . 
The r e s u l t of t h i s a n a l y s i s shows t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e to show 
t h a t we can make a d i f f e r e n t i c U t i o n , i n terms of e f f e c t s on an 
' -^  p-i#a 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s d e c i s i o n to p a r t i c i p a t e i n i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y , 'oetween 
the p r o b a b i l i t i e s of a r r e s t , c o n v i c t i o n , and punishment. 
fiandomness i n the G a i n from - i l l e g a l A c t i v i t y ; 
, .• I rt ' n'- r-' s '-: • }T i"" , ne 
There i s a l s o a p r o b a b i l i t y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the g a i n s a s s o c i a t e d 
w i t h i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s , and i s assumed, to depend on the amount of , : ^  
time spent i n such a c t i v i t y - the g r e a t e r the p o s s i b i l i t y of a l a r g e r 
g a i n . I n l i k e manner, the more p l a n n i n g done, the g r e a t e r the 
p r o b a b i l i t y of a gaih^. ' / ^ ' l 
As S j o q u i s t sugpiests, we l e t TG r e p r e s e n t the s e t of a l l p o s s i b l e 
t o t a l g a i n s from i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s , and TG^ i s an element of TG. 
P^ r e p r e s e n t s the p r o b a b i l i t y of a t t a i n i n g TG., where f^=^{t^,TG^), 
and P.=l i f t =TG = 0 . 9 2 
A I The v a l u e of the expected g a i n from i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y w i l l be .-: 
I . ' " T G . ' ' / ' P ( t 2 . T G . ) d r G . 1 
4 
5 2 
and the expected u t i l i t y 
( a . ) fo ^idd.^) . PCtg.TG. )dTG^. 9 2 
I f we combine ( a . ) x^fith the g a i n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h l e g a l a c t i v i t y , 
J G ^(G^+g^) , / J l t ^ . T G . )dTG^. 
We can see, then, t h a t the new f o r m u l a t i o n does not change the b a s i c 
r e s u l t s d e r i v e d e a r l i e r . 
Assuming t h - i t 
g ^ ( t ^ ) + g 2 ( t 2 ^ ^ TG. . PClg.TG. )dTG.+g^(t-L) 
or t h a t the a c t u a l v a l u e s a r e the same, then., i f tne i n d i v i d u a l i s 
r i s k a v e r s e , the c e r t a i n g a i n w i l l be p r e f e r r e d , to the u n c e r t a i n one. 
T h e r e f o r e i t appears l e s s l i k e l y t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l w u l d p a r t i c i p a t e 
i n i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s . 
I f the i n d i v i d u a l ' s m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y of money i s i n c r e a s i n g , he 
i s an i n d i v i d u a l who p r e f e r s r i s k , and the r e s u l t s of a n a l y s i s would 
d i f f e r . The c o n d i t i o n s f o r the slope of h i s i n d i f f e r e n c e c u r v e would 
not change 
^ " ( g ^ + g g ) ^ ^ r . v ( p ) 9 3 
> j t . 
t h a t i s , the slope would be n e g a t i v e . 
But we c a n ' t r e a l l y t e l l i f t h a t c u r v e i s c o n e i v e or convex. 
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Because of the r l d k p r e f e r e n c e i n t h i s c a s e , 
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T h e r e f o r e the f i r s t term on the r i g h t of ( b . ) i s p o s i t i v e , the second 
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I n F i g u r e 14, the i n d i f f e r e n c e curve i s concove and r e p r e s e n t s 
the s i t u a t i o n i n which an i n d i v i d u a l w i l l s p e c i a l i z e i n c r i m e . I f 
r i n c r e a s e s , the i n d i f f e r e n c e c u rve slope becomes l a r g e r n e g a t i v e l y 
( s r a a l l e r a b s o l u t e l y ) , but t h e r e w i l l be no e f f e c t on the i n d i v i d . u a l 
u n l e s s r i n c r e a s e s enough to cause the i n d i f f e r e n c e c u rve slope to 
f a l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y c a u s i n g the i n d i v i d u a l to s h i f t from the c o r n e r 
where t2 = t Q , to the c o r n e r where t - j ^ = t Q ( a s shown i n F i g u r e 1 5 ) . 
T h e r e f o r e , even when the i n d i f f e r e n c e c u r v e i s concave, i n c r e a s e s 
i n r , p, g-j , or a d e c r e a s e i n g2 w i l l cause the i n d i v i d u a l to spend 
l e s s time i n i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y , p r o v i d i n g parameter changes a r e 
l a r g e enough. 
S j o q u l s t ' s model, as p r e s e n t e d , i s an attempt to demonstrate t h a t 
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the t h e o r e t i c a l framework used to e x p l a i n p a r t i c u l a r forms of 
l e g a l b e h a v i o r can j u s t as a p t l y be a p p l i e d to the r e a l m of i l l e g a l 
b e h a v i o r . His t h e o r e t i c a l model of c r i m i n a l b e h a v i o r i s based on 
the assumption t h a t , i n an economic sense, c r i m i n a l b e h a v i o r i s a. 
r a t i o n a l u n d e r t a k i n g . H i s model s t a t e s t h a t the amount of crime 
i s i n v e r s e l y , r e l a t e d to the p r o b a b i l i t y of a r r e s t , c o n v i c t i o n , and 
punishment, the ara,ount of punishment and the g a i n from l e g a l a c t i v i t 
and i s a l s o d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the g a i n from i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y . 
S j o q u i s t t e s t e d h i s model e m p i r i c a l l y , u s i n g a c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l 
sample of s m a l l e r communities and r u n n i n g a number of r e p r r e s s i d n s 
u s i n g major p r o p e r t y c r i m e s as a measure of c r i m e . 9 7 From the 
evide.nce presented, b.y t h i s massive d a t a c o l l e c t i o n , he was a b l e to 
prove t h a t the e m p i r i c a l r e s u l t s supported, the o r l - o l n a l h y p o t h e s i s . 
An i n t e r e s t i n g i m c l l c a t i o n of t h i s a n a l y s i s i s t h a t i n a d d i t i o n 
to p r o v i d i n g evidence f o r the model, the e m p i r i c a l r e s u l t s c o u l d 
be used a s an i n p u t of a c o s t - b e n e f i t study of the c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e 
system. To determine the r e l a t i v e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the p o l i c e i n 
p r e v e n t i n g c r i m e s , i t would be n e c e s s a r y to know the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between the number of a r r e s t s and the amount of p o l i c e , and the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the amount of crime and the number of a r r e s t s . 
The l a t t e r h a l f has been p r o v i d e d by S j o q u i s t . 
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I V . SUMMARY Am CONCLUSIONS 
U n t i l a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s reached of the t o t a l realm, of 
c r i m i n a l economic behavior, a p p r o p r i a t e measxures of p r e v e n t i o n and. 
c o n t r o l may not e f f e c t i v e l y he i n i t i a t e d . To i n s u r e t h a t t n i s 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s f o r t h c o m i n g on a p o l i c y making l e v e l , support should 
be g i v e n to s t u d i e s of i n d i v i d u a l c a s e s of crime w i t h a d e f i n i t e 
view to d e c i d i n g on the b e s t d i s p o s i t i o n of funds on s t a t e as w e l l 
as f e d e r a l l e v e l s . 
The g r e a t range of our ignorance and the enormous p o t e n t i a l f o r 
r e s e a r c h and development i n t h i s f i e l d c o n f r o n t us w i t h a pro'-lem 
of p r i o r i t i e s which i s not e a s i l y s o l v a b l e . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , one of 
the most important c o n t r i b u t i o n s of the P r e s i d e n t ' s Crime Commission 
was i t s r e c o g n i t i o n of the f a c t t h a t the t e c h n i q u e s of svsteras an.al.vsls 
can be a p p l i e d to the crirae problem.9 8 One of tne prime advantages 
of such a n a l . y s i s ( w h i c h has a l r e a d y been s u c c e s s i u l l . / a p p l i e d to such 
complex systems as nationa], economies and a i r t r a f f i c s ystems) i s t h a t 
i t p r o v i d e s a means f o r d e t e r m i n i n g which of a number of a l t e r n a t i v e 
c o u r s e s of a c t i o n w i l l p r o v i d e tne maximum amount of e f f e c t i v e n e s s 
f o r a g i v e n c o s t , and t h i s mathematical a n a l . y s i s can as e a s i l y be 
a p p l i e d to i l l e g a l as w e l l as l e g a l oehavior systems. 
The essence of t h i s tecn-uique i s to c o n s t r u c t a mathematical 
d e s c r i p t i o n or model of the g i v e n system i n the l i g h t of which i t 
i s p o s s i ' i l e to conduct s i m u l a t e d experiments which m*a'.- i n d i c a t e how 
the r e a l l i f e system may be b e t t e r o r g a n i z e d and operated. For the 
a r e a of c r i m i n a l b e h a v i o r t h i s s o r t of e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n through the 
m a n i p u l a t i o n of models i s p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p r o p r i a t e f o r any s o r t of 
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i n t e r v e n t i o n i n a c t u a l o p e r a t i o n s i s o f t e n d i f f i c u l t as w e l l as 
i m p r a c t i c a l and c o s t l y . 
A t the p r e s e n t time t h i s r e a l m of a n a l y s i s has only b r i e f l y been 
touched as economists begin to r e a l i z e i t s i n n a t e p o t e n t i a l i n the 
a r e a of crime. U n f o r t u n a t e l y much of the n e c e s s a r y d a t a f o r compre-
h e n s i v e a n a l y s i s i s not y e t a v a i l a b l e , but once o b t a i n e d , modern 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l methods w i l l make i t p o s s i b l e to e s t i m a t e p o s s i b l e 
consequences and b e n e f i t s of any proposed changes. There a r e , however 
a v a r i e t y of s o c i a l c o s t s and o b v i o u s l y n o n q u a n t i f i a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 
such a s j u s t i c e , i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y , and p e r s o n a l r e a c t i o n s which 
a r i s e i n . s u c h a d i s c u s s i o n which l o g i c a l l y cannot be t r e a t e d i n t h i s 
manner. What systems a n a l y s i s does i s enable us to see c l e a r l y 
those a s p e c t s of a problem which can be q u a n t i f i a b l y measured and 
makes a.pparent avenues of o p e r a t i o n which take them i n t o account. 
S c i e n c e and technology must t h e r e f o r e begin to d e a l w i t h the 
problem through systems a n a l y s i s s t u d i e s . Only on the b a s i s of 
such s t u d i e s can n a l i o n a l d e c i s i o n s be made on s p e c i f i c a r e a s which 
a r e most c r i t i c a l l y i n need of comprehensive r e s e a r c h and which 
p o s s i b l e l i n e s of development open a r e l i k e l . v to p o i n t the way to 
most e f f e c t i v e c o u r s e s of a c t i o n i n c o n t r o l l i n g c r i m e . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , we need not a w a i t r e s u l t s of such a l l - i n c l u s i v e 
s t u d i e s b efore resea.rch of a s c i e n t i f i c n a t u r e i s a p p r o p r i a t e l y 
a p p l i e d to a r e a l m once c o n s i d e r e d p u r e l y s o c i o l o g i c a l i n n a t u r e . 
I n the meantime, through e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n w i t h i n the p r e s e n t system, 
immediate o p e r a t i o n a l improvements may become apparent. E * v a l u a t i v e 
r e s e a r c h i n t o ong.uing systems and c o n t r o l l e d experiments w i t h new 
5 7 
methods and t e c h n i q u e s must t h e r e f o r e be an i n t e g r a l f e a t u r e i.n 
any attempt to a n a l y z e the problems r e v o l v i n g around c r i m i n a l behavior. 
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